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A NEW "U": ORGANIZING VICTIMS AND PROTECTING
IMMIGRANT WORKERS
Leticia M. Saucedo *
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the viability and potential effectiveness of
immigration law's U visa to contribute to the protection of groups
of workers in substandard and dangerous workplaces. Immigra-
tion law has increasingly become an obstacle to the enforcement
of employment and labor law to protect immigrant workers.
Moreover, employment and labor law, with their individual rights
frameworks, have proven blunt instruments in eradicating the
type of subordinating, sometimes slave-like conditions of immi-
grant workers, especially those in low-wage industries. The fed-
eral government recently issued long-awaited regulations govern-
ing U nonimmigrant visas for certain crime victims.1 Several of
the enumerated eligible crimes in the U visa statutory provisions
encompass labor exploitation.2 The U visa regulations demon-
strate how the interplay between employment and immigration
law can provide the protection that immigrants need as a prereq-
uisite to remedy workplace wrongs.
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Las Vegas; J.D., 1996, Harvard Law School. I thank Fran Ansley, Annette Appell, Maria
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gratitude to the Boyd faculty community for continued support and encouragement.
1. The Depart of Homeland Security ("DHS"), through the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), issued the U visa regulations on September 17,
2007, and it became effective thirty days after its approval. See New Classification for Vic-
tims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014
(Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified in scattered parts of 8 C.F.R.).
2. See id. at 53,036.
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The U visa grants nonimmigrant status to victims of crime who
have "suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result
of' being victims of criminal activity, and who have been, will be,
or are being cooperative with law enforcement officials in the in-
vestigation or prosecution of the crime.' Initially, the government
implemented the statute to protect domestic violence or sex crime
victims because the legislation was a companion to the Violence
Against Women Act for which women's groups advocated.4 The
legal scholarship addressing U visa implementation has focused
on this group of crime victims as individual victims.5 A minority
of scholarship has addressed the use of the U visa or any other
visa status to protect against workplace crimes.6 As yet, no schol-
arship has directly suggested the U visa serve as a foundation for
enhancing the collective rights of immigrant workers in substan-
dard workplaces. This article addresses the viability of the U visa
as a vehicle for creating power for the collective in the context of a
regulatory scheme that recognizes the existence of criminal activ-
ity in immigrant-dominated workplaces.
Part I of this article documents the varying aspects of govern-
ment activity that elevate the immigrant community's fears, and
proposes the U visa as the civil rights-conferring mechanism to
empower workplace immigrants. Part II provides the statutory
background for the U visa, and explains its dual identity as both
a law enforcement and protection vehicle for individual crime vic-
3. 8 U.S.C. § ll01(a)(15)(U) (2000).
4. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-222, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13931 (2000)).
5. See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law
Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMoRY L.J. 1059 (2002); Orde F. Kittrie,
Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1449 (2006); Lori A. Nessel, Forced to Choose: Torture, Family Reunification, and United
States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 897 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern
American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 983 (1999); Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503
(2007); Laura Ho, Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp, (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Work-
ers Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383 (1996); Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace:
The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345,
393 (2001) (suggesting the need for a new visa modeled after the S and T visas to protect
undocumented workers seeking to exercise their labor rights); Leticia M. Saucedo, The
Browning of the American Workplace: Protecting Workers in Increasingly Latino-ized Oc-
cupations, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 303 (2004); Julie A. Su, The Progressive Critique of the
Current Socio-legal Landscape: Corporations and Economic Justice, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC.
JUST. 237 (2005).
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tims. Part III analyzes the use of the U visa as a means for pro-
tection within the labor and employment enforcement scheme. It
analyzes the cases in which workplace violations overlap with the
U visa enumerated crimes, and concludes that labor and em-
ployment agencies can support U visa protection for undocu-
mented workers. Part IV takes the analysis one step further, ar-
guing that the Department of Labor ("DOL") and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") should use the
U visa mechanism as part of a broader strategy for protecting col-
lective rights of immigrants in exploitative workplaces. It ana-
lyzes the viability of the U visa as a tool for establishing such a
collective right. Part V recommends U visa provision fixes to
strengthen the effectiveness of a U visa strategy for supporting
collective rights.
I. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE: GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
ENGENDERING COLLECTIVE IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY FEARS
Over the past several years, undocumented workers have faced
workplace disenfranchisement as a result of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., which
effectively limited undocumented workers' rights to organize in
the workplace, and forced them deeper into the shadows.7 Federal
government workplace raids,' efforts to use the Social Security
system to identify and purge undocumented workers from pay-
rolls,9 and increasing enforcement efforts are all also aimed at
curbing undocumented immigration.1 ° Those most affected and
with the fewest avenues for recourse in the law include workers
whose employers take advantage of their status and fail to pay
adequate (or any) wages, discriminate openly in the workplace,
and violate labor and safety laws with impunity because of weak
laws and weak employer enforcement efforts.
7. Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002); see
also Saucedo, supra note 6, at 304-05 (discussing the dramatic increase of Latino workers
ii certain occupations and the subsequent worsening of salary and working conditions).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 58-71.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 49-57.
2008]
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A. Hoffman as a Basis of Immigrant Community Fears
When the Supreme Court decided in Hoffman that an undocu-
mented worker did not have the right to backpay for work not
performed or to reinstatement in a dispute arising under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), it effectively neutralized at-
tempts to organize low-wage workers in "brown collar" indus-
tries."1 In Hoffman, an undocumented worker, Juan Castro, sued
Hoffman Plastic Compounds for unfair labor practices under the
NLRA when the company fired him for organizing activities. 12
The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), understanding
the importance of protecting undocumented workers in order to
uphold the principle of collective bargaining free from employer
pressures, sided with Castro. It awarded him sufficient damages
to deter the company from taking advantage of its leverage over
undocumented and immigrant workers.13 The Supreme Court
disagreed, concluding that undocumented workers could not avail
themselves of some of the remedies in labor law if they were in
the country illegally.14 The Court's opinion specifically addressed
the limited remedial powers of the NLRB in granting backpay for
work not performed. 15 Because the NLRB did not have the power
to grant backpay when the worker lacked work authorization, the
Supreme Court reversed the backpay award granted to the em-
ployee.16 Since Hoffman, courts have ruled that other employ-
ment statutes, such as Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), could be read broadly to include remedies that the
judiciary had the power to enforce such as backpay, front pay,
and compensatory and punitive damages.17 Nonetheless, the im-
11. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 149; see also Gordon, supra note 6, at 539 n.122 (discuss-
ing the Supreme Court's ruling in Hoffman).
12. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 140.
13. Id. at 140-42.
14. Id. at 146.
15. Id. at 142-44.
16. Id. at 145-46.
17. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming a
protective order prohibiting NIBCO from using the discovery process to inquire into the
plaintiffs' immigration status, and finding that Hoffman did not apply to undocumented
workers in Title VII actions because a district court, unlike the NLRB, has the authority
and the remedial discretion to interpret both Title VII and IRCA); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting a protective order prohibiting discovery
into Plaintiffs immigration status because Hoffman was not relevant to claims for unpaid
wages under the FLSA); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying discovery into Plaintiffs immigration status because Hoffman
[Vol. 42:891
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pact of Hoffman has devastated workers' organizing efforts. Be-
cause Hoffman left undocumented workers without a viable rem-
edy for an employer's unlawful employment practices during an
organizing campaign, the decision effectively shut out this group
of workers from participating in collective bargaining activities.
Even the most egregious workplace abuses that could be amelio-
rated through enforcement of labor or employment laws, or
through collective bargaining, would not be challenged because
undocumented workers are afraid to complain.18
The "brown collar" industries-those populated by recently ar-
rived immigrant workers-are especially hard hit by fears over
employer retaliation because newly arrived immigrant workers in
these industries are more than likely undocumented.19 Over the
past decade, the meatpacking, poultry, manufacturing, construc-
tion, service, and domestic industries have joined agriculture as
the predominantly immigrant workforces.2 ° The influx has oc-
curred in other industries as well. The racial makeup of the six
workers killed in the recent mining accident in Utah illustrates
the turning of the American workforce to brown.2'
did not necessarily apply to FLSA actions to recover backpay for work actually performed);
Flores v. Albertsons, Inc., No. CV0100515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2002) (denying Defendant's discovery of documents to determine whether Plaintiffs were
using false social security numbers because FLSA protections "are available to citizens
and undocumented workers alike," and Hoffman did not bar undocumented employees
from recovering unpaid wages for work actually performed).
18. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Employer Preference for the Subservient Worker and
the Making of the Brown Collar Workplace, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 961, 968 (2006); see also Nes-
sel, supra note 5, at 347-49.
19. Saucedo, supra note 6, at 304.
20. RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND
MOBILITY OF HISPANICS 3 Fig. 1 (Dec. 15, 2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/59.pdf (showing Hispanics outnumber Whites, Blacks, and Asians in farming, con-
struction, and production industry); Randy Capps, U.S. Immigrant Workers and Families:
Demographics, Labor Market Participation, and Children's Education, 14 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 170, 192-93 (2007) ("Agriculture has, for decades, had a large migrant popula-
tion that includes many undocumented workers, but the numbers of lower-skilled immi-
grants are increasing rapidly in a wide variety of industries such as construction, manu-
facturing, and services .... For instance, in 2002, 42% of private household workers and
37% of farming and forestry workers were immigrants."); Saucedo, supra note 6, at 307.
21. Three of the miners trapped in the workplace accident in the heavily white state
were Mexican nationals. Garance Burke, Accident Highlights Latino Influx into the State's
Mining Industry, BOSTON.COM, Aug. 10, 2007, available at http://www.boston.comlnews/
nation/articles/2007/08/10/accidenthighlights-latinoinflux intothe-states-miningjindu
stry/.
2008]
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B. The ICE Raids as a Basis of Immigrant Community Fears
Recent Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") raids in
low-wage workplaces have compounded the negative effects of
Hoffman, leaving workers feeling even more vulnerable.22 ICE
strategy has focused on traditionally immigrant-dominated in-
dustries such as meatpacking, construction, poultry processing,
and service.23 ICE has calculated raids to instill fear in both em-
ployers and employees in such workplaces. When ICE officials
raided Swift meatpacking facilities last December, they sur-
rounded plants, sealed off entrances, and rounded up the entire
workforce regardless of documentation status.24 Citizens and non-
citizens alike were detained for up to ten hours before they were
allowed to leave.25
Workplace raids have combined with the home raids of ICE's
Operation Return to Sender to exacerbate fears in the immigrant
community.26 The raids have torn apart mixed-status families
and have violated citizens' and legal permanent residents' rights.
Several organizations have filed lawsuits on behalf of both docu-
mented and undocumented immigrants and labor unions affected
22. See, e.g., Nicole Gaouette, Six Meat Plants are Raided in Massive I.D. Theft Case,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A18; Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Remarks by Sec-
retary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Assistant Secretary Julie Myers, and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt
Majoras at a Press Conference on Operation Wagon Train, Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.dhs.
gov/xnews/releases/pr-1166047951514.shtm. See generally Raquel E. Aldana, Of Katz and
Aliens: Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2008).
23. See, e.g., KOCHHAR, supra note 20, at Fig.1. (showing Hispanic outnumber Whites,
Blacks, and Asians in farming, construction and production industries); Andrea Hopkins,
Immigration Raids Koch Foods Ohio Chicken Plant, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 28, 2007, http:ll
www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN2825845020070828 (explaining that more than
160 workers were arrested on charges of false use of social security numbers, fraud, and
identity theft); Geralda Miller, Agents Arrest 56 Workers, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Sept.
28, 2007, at 1A (explaining that ICE raided eleven McDonald's franchises and arrested
and detained fifty-six workers suspected of illegal status); Liza Porteus, Feds Raid Six
Swift and Company Meatpacking Plants in Apparent Illegal Immigration Search, Fox
NEWS.COM, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,236044,00.html.
24. Marc Cooper, Lockdown in Greeley: How Immigration Raids Terrorized a Colorado
Town, THE NATION, Feb. 26, 2007, at 11.
25. Id.; see also Complaint at 11, United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 2-07CV-188-J, 11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) [hereinafter
United Food Complaint] (describing the detention of workers in the Swift plant).
26. See Nina Bernstein, Immigration Raids Single Out Hispanics, Lawsuit Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/21lnyregi
on/21raids.html?_r=l&ex=1191038400&en=e3559da5c8a2aOea&ei=5070&emc=etal&oref
=slogin.
[Vol. 42:891
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by the raids.27 As a result of the raids on six Swift plants, ICE
made more than 1100 administrative arrests and 150 criminal
arrests. 28 During the raids, all of the workers were "told to re-
main in specific locations for interrogation, and were not free to
leave those areas, regardless of their citizenship or immigration
status."29 The lawsuits allege that the arrests were not supported
by "reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that they
were immigrants present in the United States in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act or otherwise subject to sei-
zure."3" The lawsuits allege that the ICE raids violated 8 U.S.C. §
1357(a)(2), which gives immigration officers the power to arrest
"any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that
the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any
such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant
can be obtained for his arrest."3 The statute allows ICE deten-
tions for deportation only if there is a reasonable suspicion, based
upon specific and articulable facts, that the person is present in
the United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("INA").32 As the lawsuit argues, ICE's
policy and practice of engaging in mass warrant less group detention
of all workers during work-place enforcement activities without rea-
sonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that such detained
workers are immigrants present in the United States in violation of
the Immigration and Nationality Act violate 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
33
The lawsuit also challenges on Fourth and Fifth Amendment
grounds ICE's authority to conduct warrant less searches.34
27. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Aguilar v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 07-Civ-8224
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2007); United Food Complaint, supra note 25, at 10 (challenging raids
at six Swift meat producing companies in the United States); Complaint at 1-2, Mancha v.
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-CV-2650-TWT (N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2006) (challenging
home raids resulting from initial ICE operation seeking undocumented workers at a poul-
try plant in Stillmore, Georgia).
28. See United Food Complaint, supra note 25, at 10-11.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2000).
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (holding that an inves-
tigative stop near border for questioning about immigration status is allowed if the officer
has specific, articulable facts that would reasonably warrant suspicion of illegal status).
33. United Food Complaint, supra note 25, at 13.
34. Id. at 13-14.
20081
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Legal scholar Raquel Alana notes that both the warrantless
and the administrative warrant searches have tested the limits of
the Fourth Amendment even when they are targeted at undocu-
mented immigrants.35 ICE officials can raid workplaces with
some degree of impunity,36 however, because of the limited scope
of the Fourth Amendment in protecting immigrants and the ero-
sion of privacy expectations in the workplace.37 Alana concludes
that workers may be unable to challenge government workplace
searches individually because of wide leeway granted to ICE in
seeking out undocumented workers. 38 This relative inability of
undocumented immigrants to seek constitutional remedies ren-
ders them powerless.
C. Legislative and Regulatory Bases of Immigrant Community
Fears
In addition to the above factors raising the fears of immigrants,
the failure of comprehensive immigration reform,39 the passage of
border enforcement legislation,4" the enactment of the REAL ID
Act,4' and the impending implementation of regulations govern-
ing no-match letters" signal to undocumented immigrants that
35. See generally Aldana, supra note 22.
36. Id. at 116 ("The threshold for a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy in a
worker's immigration status is likely quite high in light of the heavily regulated nature of
workplace immigration enforcement that allows unregulated databases, compels employer
collaboration,' and sanctions general warrants.").
37. Id. at 115 ("Such erosion occurs through statutes authorizing the creation of data-
bases from which ICE has easy access to obtain civil warrants to conduct raids without
particularized suspicion.").
38. Id. at 155. Aldana notes that broader considerations, such as effects on community
or protections of vulnerable groups, should be considered in curtailing police power
through the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 154-55.
39. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong.
(2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=sllO-1348; (failing to
receive enough votes to be considered in the Senate); Klaus Marre, 46-53, Immigration
Bill Goes Down in Defeat, THE HILL.COM, June 28, 2007, http://thehill.com/leading-the-
news/immigration-bill-goes-down-in-defeat-2007-06-28.html.
40. See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006),
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl09-6061; Suzanne Gamboa,
House Approves 700-Mile Border Fence, BOSTON.COM, Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.bos
ton.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2006/09/15/house-approves-700 mileborder_
fence/.
41. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-113, 119 Stat. 231 (2005) available at
http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-1268.
42. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a). The AFL-CIO, the ACLU,
[Vol. 42:891
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they should stay in the shadows when it comes to workplace
abuses.
The failure of comprehensive immigration reform left the im-
migrant community demoralized. Congress failed to reach a com-
promise that would protect both our borders and legalize already
present undocumented immigrants.43 The failure to enact legisla-
tion would not have been so devastating if so many immigrants
and their supporters had not fought so hard for changes in the
immigration system." The immigrant marches in major cities
around the country in 2006 and 2007 created both publicity and
hope for the immigrant community that legislation would produce
changes.45 The equally well-publicized defeat of comprehensive
immigration reform made all Latinos, regardless of immigration
status, perceive an increase in discrimination against Hispan-
ics."
The enactment of REAL ID reflects the sentiment that un-
documented immigrants should not have the same privileges,
such as driver's licenses, as their native-born neighbors.4" States
have had mixed reactions, sometimes seeking tiered status driv-
ers' licenses for undocumented immigrants, as a way of amelio-
rating REAL ID's effects.4"
the National Immigration Law Center, and other organizations recently won a prelimi-
nary injunction halting the enactment of the regulations pending a hearing on their con-
stitutionality. See AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, No. C07-04472, 2007 WL 2972952 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
10, 2007) (enjoining and restraining the Department of Homeland Security and the Social
Security Administration from implementing the Final Rule of "Safe-Harbor Procedures for
Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter").
43. See Carl Hulse & Robert Pear, Immigration Bill Fails to Survive Senate Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/
28cnd-immig.html
44. Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and
the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99-101
(2007).
45. Id.
46. Pew Hispanic Center, 2006 National Survey of Latinos: The Immigration Debate,
13, available at http://pew hispanic.org/files/reports/68.pdf.
47. See Emergency Supplement Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror and Tsunami Relief 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(B), 119 Stat. 231 (2005)
(requiring a state to verify evidence of lawful immigration status before issuing a driver's
license or identification card to any person) (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 30301 under Statutory
Notes).
48. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Spitzer Tries New Tack on Immigrant Licenses, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/nyregion/28
spitzer.html?_r=2&oref=slogin.
20081
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Collaborations between local law enforcement and federal im-
migration authorities also create anxieties among immigrant ad-
vocates and communities. Agreements developed under section
287(g) of the INA deputize trained local law enforcement authori-
ties to act as immigration officers to investigate, apprehend, and
detain undocumented residents. 49 Localities in twelve states have
enacted such programs with over 400 local law enforcement offi-
cials trained under the program. 0 Legal scholars have analyzed
the federal government's attempts at federal-state collaboration
and have opined on their effects on individual rights, separation
of powers, and increased efforts by localities to regulate immigra-
tion. Huyen Pham, for example, argues that the federal govern-
ment's attempts to seek cooperation from local law authorities in
immigration enforcement violates federalism principles, espe-
cially those of the responsiveness of local governments to their
constituencies.5' Requiring cooperation in the name of federal
preemption that requires cooperation over immigration policy cre-
ates policies that no longer reflect local preferences. 2 Such coop-
eration diminishes the ability of local law enforcement authorities
to maintain open contact between local law enforcement and im-
migrants who fear deportation, even as they are victimized.5 3 Lo-
cal involvement in federal government activities, such as raids,
may lead to further distrust of local police in immigrant commu-
nities.54 Such activity leaves immigrants vulnerable and without
recourse. 5 Michael Wishnie further argues that the push toward
local and state involvement in immigration enforcement creates a
risk of racial profiling, which affects immigrant communities
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000) (mandating the performance of immigration officer
functions by state officers and employees).
50. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Partners: Law Enforcement: Delega-
tion of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, http://
www.ice.gov/partners/287g/section287-g.htm?searchstring=287%20g (stating that locali-
ties in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Virginia have signed section 287(g)
agreements).
51. Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and
the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1397-1404 (2006).
52. Id. at 1398.
53. See id. at 1399-1400.
54. See, e.g., Parastoa Hassouri, CLEAR Act Will Muddy Relationships Between Po-
lice and Immigrants, ACLU N.J., http://www.aclu-nj.orglissues/immigrantrights/clearact
willmuddyrelations.htm (suggesting the Criminal Alien Removal Act, an Act which calls
for cooperation between local police and immigration officials, will undermine the trust
and confidence of immigrant communities in local law enforcement).
55. See id.
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throughout society, including the workplace.56 Such practices, in
turn, foster further distrust in the immigrant community.57 There
is no doubt that public collaborations between federal immigra-
tion officials and local law enforcement affect the relationships
between local governments and their immigrant constituencies
and increase fear levels in those communities.
Finally, the impending enactment of Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") regulations governing Social Security Admini-
stration ("SSA") no-match discoveries indicates that the federal
government intends to make employers more accountable for
their hiring practices. The regulations punish employers by im-
puting constructive knowledge to an employer that ignores SSA
no-match letters and hires an undocumented worker.5 8 Under
current practice, an employer may receive notice from the SSA
that an employee's name and social security number do not match
the Social Security database information.59 The SSA's notice to
the employer downplays the possibility that a mismatched social
security number signals undocumented immigration status. An
employer is not legally required to do anything with the informa-
tion because it cannot assume that an illegal act led to the "no-
match."6 ° A number of innocent reasons, including name change
after marriage, clerical mistakes, or database errors, could ac-
count for the no-match. Under the proposed DHS rule, however,
the employer is required to seek clarification from the employee
or to fire the employee if no clarification is forthcoming within
ninety days of the receipt of a no-match letter.61 If the employer
fails to follow certain procedures, moreover, DHS could impute to
the employer constructive knowledge that an employee did not
56. See Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1104-05 (2004).
57. See id. at 1115.
58. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,611 (Aug. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a).
59. See 20 C.F.R. § 422.120(a) (2007).
60. The Social Security Administration's 2006 model no-match letter states several
reasons for a mismatch that are all unrelated to immigration status, including typo-
graphical errors, name changes, or incomplete Form W-2's. See Employer Correction Re-
quest, Social Security Admin., available at http://www.ssa.gov/employer/SSAsampleLet
ter.pdf; see also AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, No. C07-00472, 2007 WL 2972952 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2007) (enjoining and restraining the Department of Homeland Security and the Social Se-
curity Administration from implementing the Final Rule of "Safe-Harbor Procedures for
Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter").
61. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,612-13.
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have work authorization and prosecute the employer accord-
ingly.62 Specifically, an employer would have to check its records
to determine the source of the mismatch.63 If the mismatch is not
the employer's fault, the employer must request that the em-
ployee confirm the information and advise the employee to re-
solve the matter with the SSA within ninety days of the receipt of
the no-match letter.6 4 If the employer cannot resolve any discrep-
ancy within the ninety days, it must fill out a new 1-9 form for the
employee to prove identity and work authorization.65 The em-
ployer must fill out the new 1-9 to maintain a safe-harbor from
DHS prosecution for knowingly hiring illegal aliens even if the
discrepancy is due to SSA error.66 The DHS rule threatens to pre-
sume employer knowledge based on the employer's actions after
receiving a SSA no-match letter and an accompanying DHS let-
ter.67 The DHS letter warns employers that if they "elect to dis-
regard the SSA no-match notice .. .and if it is determined that
some employees listed in the enclosed letter were not authorized
to work, the Department of Homeland Security could deter-
mine"6 that the employer violated immigration law "by know-
ingly continuing to employ unauthorized persons."69 The rule
threatens civil and criminal sanctions as a consequence.7"
Recently, a judge granted a temporary injunction against the
implementation of the regulations to a group of civil rights and
labor organizations challenging the proposal.71 The DHS subse-
62. Id. at 45,613; see also AFL-CIO, 2007 WL 2972952, at *3-4; Press Release, Nat'l
Immigration Law Ctr., Preliminary Injunction Issued: Court Blocks Government from Im-
plementing Flawed Social Security "No-Match" Rule, Oct. 10, 2007, available at http:ll
www.nilc.org/immsemplymntJSSARelated-Info/ssaOO6.htm.
63. Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 45,624 (to be codified 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(1)(2)(i)(A)).
64. Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(l)(2)(i)(B)).
65. Id. (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(1)(2)(iii)(A)(2)).
66. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2000) (making it illegal to knowingly hire
illegal aliens). An employer is also liable for "continu[ing] to employ the alien in the
United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien with respect to
such employment." 8 U.S.C. § 1342a(a)(2) (2000).
67. See Safe-Harbor Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72
Fed. Reg. at 45,624 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(1)(2)(ii)(B), (iii)(A)).
68. AFL-CIO v. Chertoff, No. C07-04472, 2007 WL 2972952, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2007) (citing to sample proposed DHS letter accompanying SSA no-match letters).
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id.
71. A number of groups, including the AFL-CIO, the San Francisco Labor Council, the
Central Labor Council of Alameda County, the San Francisco Building and Construction
Trades Council, represented by the ACLU, the National Immigration Law Center, and
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quently withdrew the proposed regulations. Notwithstanding its
withdrawal, the fact of the proposal itself may give employers
much greater power over workers who have questionable Social
Security numbers. With a proposal looming, submissive workers
are more likely to escape employer scrutiny than workers who
complain about their workplace conditions.
D. Proposed Local Enforcement of Immigration Law as a Basis of
Immigrant Community Fears
Recent state and local enforcement ordinances, such as the one
enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, further increase the anxiety
of immigrant communities. Attempts by municipalities and states
to regulates and punish undocumented residents instill fear even
if they are ultimately held unconstitutional.72 The specter of on-
erous regulations is demonstrated by the volume of proposed
state and local legislation over the past year. Approximately 570
pieces of legislation were considered at the state and local level in
2006, most of which were unfavorable to immigrants. 7 3
E. The U Visa as a Counteracting Force to Ameliorate
Immigrant Community Fears
To the extent that Hoffman represents a backlash against the
immigrant community-reflected in consequences such as the
several private law firms filed a lawsuit and a motion for preliminary injunction alleging
that the rule contravenes the governing statute, is arbitrary and capricious under the
Administrative Procedure Act, and is outside of the scope of authority of both the DHS and
the Social Security Administration. See AFL-CIO, 2007 WL 2972952, at *1. The district
court granted a preliminary injunction. Id.
72. See, e.g., HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-13 § 7 (2006), available at http://www.
hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-13%20 Landlord%2OTenant%200rdinance.pdf (requiring
prospective tenants of rental properties to obtain an occupancy permit and requires
"proper identification showing proof of legal citizenship and/or residency" before a person
can obtain an occupancy permit); HAZLETON, PA. ORDINANCE 2006-18 §§ 4, 5 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.hazletoncity.org/090806/2006-18%20-Illegal%20Alien%2OImmigration
%20Relief%20Act.pdf (making it illegal for any business to knowing employ an illegal im-
migrant and for any person or business entity that owns a dwelling to harbor an illegal
immigrant); HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-19 § 2 (2006), available at http://www.
smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-19%20-Official%2OEnglish.pdf (declaring English
as the official language of Hazleton); see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d
477, 554 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the immigration ordinance of Hazelton violated the
Supremacy Clause).
73. National Immigration Law Center, Immigration Was Key in 2006 State Legisla-
tion and Ballot Measures, 21 IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS UPDATE (Mar. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.nilc.orglimmspbs/sf benefits/sfbps003.htm.
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failure of comprehensive immigration reform-it needs a coun-
teracting force that will provide immigrant workers with ade-
quate leverage. This would define them as workers rather than
immigrants. This article proposes that such leverage comes in the
form of legal status as a form of reparation for suffering exploita-
tion rising to the level of criminal activity.7 4 A legalization
mechanism takes immigration status out of competition in the la-
bor market, just as the labor movement advocated taking wages
out of competition through the FLSA. 5 The idea-with the U visa
serving as the template and the mechanism for achieving legali-
zation-is that once immigration status becomes a non-issue, the
types of abuses that result in involuntary servitude, peonage, or
labor exploitation will also disappear. To the extent that a U visa
remedy can help workers gain some leverage in the workplace, it
will counteract the current sentiment among defenseless, un-
documented workers.
Although it is not a traditional remedy under either Title VII
or the FLSA, granting U visa status should be considered as part
of the make-whole structure in workplace violation cases. The
courts have the ability under Title VII, for example, to provide
broad remedies aimed at making the discrimination victim whole.
Section 706(g)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice
charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from
engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such af-
firmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,... or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 76
Pursuant to this language, a court may structure an order that
requires employers to help U visa victims obtain legal status as a
necessary prerequisite to making the plaintiff whole and to deter
future discrimination. Requiring legal status as part of a make-
whole remedy recognizes the particular vulnerabilities of newly
arrived immigrant workers, and provides them with legal tools to
gain leverage in the employer-employee relationship. Although
74. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6.
75. NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN
LABOR 220 (2002).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000). Such relief is also available in adverse impact
cases. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-24 (1975).
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the cooperation of several parties, including the EEOC and
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), is
important to a final grant of U nonimmigrant status, requiring
the employer to take responsibility for guiding the application
process is equivalent to an employer posting public notice of its
discriminatory practice on its premises. It shifts the cost of the
discriminatory practice onto the employer.
F. The U Visa as a Legalization and Civil Rights Vehicle
The idea of legalization as a civil right, especially for workers
whose labor sustains the low-wage labor market, has been ad-
dressed by several legal scholars. Kevin Johnson writes that open
borders provide leverage for workers and, at the same time, com-
port with the purposes of free trade agreements between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.77 Inherent in this open bor-
ders argument is the notion that a workforce must have the abil-
ity to travel legally and freely across borders. Linda Bosniak
notes that legalization and concepts of citizenship by extension
center the debate about membership in a community and con-
comitant privileges in our society.7" Jennifer Gordon argues that
transnational labor citizenship should be the governing rights-
conferring principle for immigrant workers in the United
States.79 One should not underestimate, however, the power that
a worker gains from having legal status, especially citizenship.
Jennifer Gordon has written that citizenship rights are tradition-
ally articulated in terms of membership and its privileges.80 Such
approach fails to consider that workers' rights transcend borders
in ways that other rights do not. Gordon's proxy for citizenship
rights is transnational labor rights, or labor citizenship, which, in
essence, bestows a worker with rights traditionally reserved for
citizens in the workplace."1 Gordon's working assumption is that
transnational labor rights accrue to the collective, and it is
through the collective that an individual undocumented worker
77. KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK
ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 131-67 (2007); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Open Bor-
ders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003).
78. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 18-20 (2006).
79. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 504.
80. Gordon, supra note 6, at 512-14.
81. Id. at 510-12.
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has access to protection because she is part of a broader class of
workers that as a group "refuse to work under conditions that vio-
late the law or labor agreements."82 Short of the transformation
of the labor movement in the direction toward transnationalism,
however, undocumented workers currently in the United States
will continue to rely on legalization to undo both fears and possi-
ble exploitation resulting from undocumented status.
Legalization provides workers with an enforceable right to or-
ganize and to collectively bargain. Recall that the Supreme
Court's Hoffman decision called into question the rights of un-
documented workers.8 3 Although the Court did not deny that un-
documented workers had either a right or a remedy for an em-
ployer's unfair labor practices, it limited the type of remedy that
was available. 4 Thus, for all practical purposes, undocumented
workers were left unprotected against unfair labor practices dur-
ing an organizing campaign. Legalization, therefore, makes the
Hoffman holding superfluous because, through a change in immi-
gration status, Hoffman no longer limits an immigrant's options.
Legalization also dispenses with questions about whether un-
documented status precludes other workplace rights, such as the
right to workers' compensation, unemployment benefits, or free-
dom from discrimination. 5 Therefore, legalization becomes the
method by which workers theoretically obtain some freedom from
labor exploitation.
Of course, the assumption is that with legalization an immi-
grant will benefit from many of the membership rights that im-
migration scholars have noted exist with citizenship.8 As we
have experienced with the civil rights movement of African-
Americans, however, those rights remain elusive for minorities in
82. Id. at 509-10.
83. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002).
85. Courts have held that undocumented workers continue to have such rights, al-
though they are regularly attacked as special privileges for undeserving, undocumented
workers. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-67 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
Hoffman did not apply in Title VII cases and refusing to allow discovery on immigration
status); De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-39 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (hold-
ing that Hoffman was not "dispositive of the issues raised in the motion to compel" discov-
ery of immigration status in a Title VII action); Flores v. Albertson's, Inc., No. CV-
0100515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (finding Hoffman inapplicable to
an FLSA action and refusing employer discovery requests regarding employees' immigra-
tion status).
86. See, e.g., BOSNIAK, supra note 78, at 18-20.
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the United States.87 In short, the label of legal status in no way
guarantees a transformation to a non-exploitative workplace.
Similar to the African-American civil rights experience, the im-
migrant civil rights experience may begin with governmentally
recognized abolition of labor exploitation and eventually lead to
workplace parity. Today's immigrants recognize that legal status
allows for fuller participation in the political, social, and economic
life of their communities in the United States. This was evident
in the march slogans proclaiming: "Today We March, Tomorrow
We Vote." 8 A visa, such as a U visa, does not confer any type of
civil right on an individual immigrant. The U visa may be an ini-
tial step on the path to legalization, and then toward creating the
foundation for a broader civil rights movement for Latinos and
other immigrants.
II. THE U VISA STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Congress authorized the U visa in the Victims of Trafficking
and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("TVPA")."9 The U visa con-
cept was introduced in the context of battered immigrant women
and was discussed in that section of the Act known as the Bat-
tered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000.90 It includes a
goal of fighting labor exploitation.9" The Act's dual goals of fight-
ing crime and aiding victims were accomplished through a visa
that identified certain crime victims and offered them legal status
in return for cooperating with law enforcement officials in the in-
vestigation of crimes.92 A U visa grantee has four years of non-
87. See generally Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the
Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV 2493 (2007) (dis-
cussing the relationship between citizenship, race, and full participation in societal
rights); Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L.
REV. _ (forthcoming 2008).
88. Ali Noorani, Race, Class, and the Emergence of an Immigrant Rights Movement in
the United States, 31 FLETCHER F. OF WORLD AFF. 185, 196 (2007).
89. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).
90. See Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1518, (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
91. Id. § 1513, 114 Stat. at 1535 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)); Vic-
tims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 102, 114 Stat. at 1466 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2000)).
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(I)-(III (2000).
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immigrant legal status in the United States.93 Moreover, the U
visa holder may seek permanent resident status three years after
the granting of the U visa. 94
A. Meeting Law Enforcement Goals
A major constituency behind the development of the U visa is
law enforcement at local, state, and federal levels. The Act's pur-
pose is to further law enforcement goals and objectives against
crime in immigrant communities. The visa was created to
strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to detect, investi-
gate, and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, traf-
ficking of aliens, and other crimes described in section 101(a)
(15)(U)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act committed
against aliens, while offering protection to victims of such offenses in
keeping with the humanitarian interests of the United States. This
visa will encourage law enforcement officials to better serve immi-
grant crime victims and to prosecute crimes committed against
aliens.
95
The purpose of the statute focused on the victim status of cooperat-
ing witnesses by "[cireating a new nonimmigrant visa classification
[that] will facilitate the reporting of crimes to law enforcement offi-
cials by trafficked, exploited, victimized, and abused aliens who are
not in lawful immigration status. It also gives law enforcement offi-
cials a means to regularize the status of cooperating individuals dur-
ing investigations or prosecutions.
96
The enumerated crimes for which victims who suffer substan-
tial physical or mental abuse may seek legal status as protection
range from gender violence to labor exploitation. They include the
following crimes or similar criminal activity:
rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic violence; sexual assault;
abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female geni-
tal mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude;
slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false
imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; manslaughter; murder; feloni-
ous assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; or at-
93. See id. § 1184(p)(6).
94. See id. § 1255(m).
95. Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, § 1513(a)(2)(A), 114 Stat. at
1533-34 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
96. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 1513(a)(2)(B), 114
Stat. at 1534 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
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tempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above men-
tioned crimes.
9 7
B. The U Visa's Dual Identity
1. Preventing Domestic and Sexual Violence
The prevalent U visa crime victim paradigm involves a female
domestic or sexual violence victim who will not come forward to
denounce her abuser for fear of retaliation or fear of contact with
law enforcement. U visa protection was created, in part, to pro-
tect victims within traditionally vulnerable immigrant communi-
ties. In a sense, the paradigmatic U visa grantee is the essential-
ized victim of bad behavior as described by legal scholar Leti
Volpp. 8 Volpp argues against the stereotype of domestic or sex-
ual violence as cultural99 and of the victim as passive, disempow-
ered, and worth of protection.0 0 The U visa crime victim para-
digm is often gendered, as is evident from the types of crimes-
rape, sexual assault, trafficking, slavery-for which there is pro-
tection. The victim is one who is forced into sex-related activities
such as prostitution through indentured servitude or trafficking.
This, it seems, is the disempowered, worthy victim the legislation
aimed to protect. The Department of State's Trafficking in Per-
sons Report notes several different forms of trafficking, many of
which are gender-specific. For example, it lists girls in domestic
servitude, forced child labor, and prostitution as the forms of traf-
ficking that victimize vulnerable populations.01 The TVPA, the
companion to the U visa enabling legislation, specifically names
sex trafficking in the definition of severe forms of trafficking:
The term "severe forms of trafficking in persons" means-(A) sex
trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud,
or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has
not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring,
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2000).
98. See Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 89
(2000) (arguing that the behavior of minority or devalued communities tends to be ex-
plained as culturally influenced); Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and
Law, 27 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 507, 510-13 (2002).
99. Volpp, Blaming Culture, supra note 98 at 89-90.
100. See id. at 509.
101. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 18-28 (2007), http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/8290 2 .pdf.
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transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or ser-
vices, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of
subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slav-
102
ery.
The language and ensuing government campaigns regarding
trafficking make enforcement officials think twice about spending
resources on other forms of labor exploitation. In the T visa con-
text, all cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") in
fiscal year 2004 involved sexual exploitation. 
1 0 3
2. Addressing Labor Exploitation
The U visa was, in fact, developed to protect victims of labor
exploitation in addition to victims of domestic or gender violence.
A mechanism parallel to the U visa provision, the T visa was de-
veloped in the Act for victims of severe forms of human traffick-
ing for either labor or sexual exploitation purposes. 10 4 It tracks
the enumerated crimes in the U visa provisions, specifically, in-
voluntary servitude and trafficking. The TVPA contains language
and definitions of these crimes that are useful for understanding
the overall purpose and intended use of the U visa. Among the
congressional findings outlining the need for protection are the
following:
(3) Trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex industry. This
growing transnational crime also includes forced labor and involves
significant violations of labor, public health, and human rights stan-
dards worldwide.
(4) Traffickers primarily target women and girls, who are dispropor-
tionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to education, chronic
unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of economic opportuni-
ties in countries of origin. Traffickers lure women and girls into their
networks through false promises of decent working conditions at
relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, res-
taurant workers, sales clerks, or models. Traffickers also buy chil-
102. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 103(8), 114 Stat. at
1470 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8)-(9) (2000)).
103. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 101, at 243; see also Dina Francesca
Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural
Failures To Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 337, 353-56 (2007) (noting government actors' service to sex crimes and victimization
in their enforcement of the TVPA).
104. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, § 107(e), 114 Stat. at
1477-79 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2000)).
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dren from poor families and sell them into prostitution or into vari-
ous types of forced or bonded labor.
Trafficking for such purposes as involuntary servitude, peonage, and
other forms of forced labor has an impact on the nationwide em-
ployment network and labor market. Within the context of slavery,
servitude, and labor or services which are obtained or maintained
through coercive conduct that amounts to a condition of servitude,
victims are subjected to a range of violations. 105
The definitions of labor exploitation in the Act also provide
some insight into the types of activities that Congress sought to
target.
The term "involuntary servitude" includes a condition of servitude
induced by means of-(A) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to
cause a person to believe that, if the person did not enter into or con-
tinue in such condition, that person or another person would suffer
serious harm or physical restraint; or (B) the abuse or threatened
abuse of the legal process.
The term "coercion" means-(A) threats of serious harm to or physi-
cal restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern in-
tended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act
would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any
person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.
The term "debt bondage" means the status or condition of a debtor
arising from a pledge by the debtor of his or her personal services or
of those of a person under his or her control as a security for debt, if
the value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied to-
ward the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined. 106
Thus, while both the U and T visas further the purpose of pro-
tecting battered women and children, they were also meant to
prevent labor exploitation, as is evident from the definitions
above.
105. Id. § 102(b), 114 Stat. at 1466-67 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)
(2000)).
106. Id. § 103, 114 Stat. at 1469 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2000)).
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Labor exploitation in sweatshops was the prototypical form of
subordination at the time that Congress debated the TVPA.
10 7
One major impetus for the TVPA was the discovery in 1995 of il-
legal sweatshops operating out of apartment buildings in El
Monte, California.0 8 Widespread publicity about the slave-like
conditions in the sweatshops led to reforms.' 09
After Congress implemented the TVPA, the DOJ, charged with
prosecuting trafficking and related federal crimes, created a
worker exploitation task force to screen for trafficking cases. 1 °
High level officers of agencies such as the DOL and the EEOC
participated in the task force."' The government's Trafficking in
Persons 2005 annual report notes the DOL's involvement in low-
wage industry investigations:
The DOL's Wage and Hour Division is taking aggressive action to
identify and eliminate abusive labor practices that affect the most
vulnerable in our society. Investigators focus on low-wage industries
where labor trafficking victims are most often found. And Wage and
Hour staff works with the consulates of Mexico and other countries,
along with NGOs, to reach out to immigrant communities. 112
The language of the TVPA, the agencies' recognition that labor
exploitation crimes require collaboration to combat, and their
continued involvement in enforcing their own laws to eradicate
labor abuses all demonstrate that the Act had roots in labor ex-
ploitation prevention even as it professed a purpose to protect
battered women and children.
C. The Gap in Workplace Protection: Government Failure to
Enact U Visa Regulations
DHS, the agency responsible for implementing the U visa, did
not issue regulations until September 2007, seven years after the
enactment of legislation authorizing U visas.1 3 The interim regu-
107. See, e.g., Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
108. See Julie A. Su, supra note 6, at 238, 240-42.
109. See id. at 241-42.
110. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND
WORKER EXPLOITATION, Task Force, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/tpwetf.htm (last visited
Feb. 13, 2008).
111. Id.
112. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT, supra note 101, at 247.
113. See Press Release, Legal Momentum, U Visa Regulations Released (Sept. 5, 2007),
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lations were the product of several years of negotiation and con-
sultation with battered women's and immigrants' advocacy
groups." 4 The regulations themselves reflect such consultation.
The proposed regulations take into account, for example, the need
to keep families of victims together as much as possible. They al-
low for more than one direct victim of a crime,115 and prohibit
only family members who perpetrate domestic violence or traf-
ficking crimes from qualifying for derivative status." 6
In the absence of implementing regulations and official appli-
cation forms, the USCIS granted eligible victims deferred action
status, which allowed them to remain in the country with em-
ployment authorization until their applications were finally adju-
dicated." 7 Immigrant advocates and attorneys filed their own
versions of applications seeking deferred action in this interim
period. Over 7000 such applications were filed, and about 5800
were accepted for deferred action during the seven year period be-
fore the interim regulations were released." 8 Many, if not the ma-
jority, of the applicants were victims of domestic or gender vio-
lence. During this period, the federal government conducted very
little community outreach to inform the public of the different
contexts for which the U visa was available. In particular, gov-
ernmental labor and employment agencies did not regularly par-
ticipate as law enforcement agencies willing or able to issue law
enforcement certifications to eligible victims who cooperated.
D. The Law Enforcement Certification as a Part of Labor and
Employment Law Enforcement Tools
Cooperation with law enforcement is an eligibility requirement
for the granting of a U visa. The statute requires a U visa appli-
cant to obtain a law enforcement certification ("LEC") from a law
enforcement official that the crime victim/applicant has been, is,
available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5797.
114. Id.
115. See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,017 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
214.14(a)(14)(i)).
116. Id. at 53,025.
117. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activities; Eligibility for "U" Non-
immigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,013, 53,015 (Sept. 17, 2007).
118. USCIS, FACT SHEET, USCIS PUBLISHES RULE FOR NONIMMIGRANT VICTIMS OF
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/U-
VisaFS-05Sep07.pdf.
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or is likely to be helpful in the investigation or prosecution of one
of the enumerated crimes.119 The certification must be from "a
Federal, State, or local law enforcement official, prosecutor,
judge, or other Federal, State, or local authority investigating"
one or more of the enumerated crimes or similar criminal activ-
ity. 120 The Act itself does not define law enforcement agency nor
does it specify which law enforcement agencies are qualified to
provide the needed law enforcement certification to U visa appli-
cants. The interim regulations identify the head of the certifying
agency or a designated official as the appropriate person to sign
the LEC, presumably in an attempt to regulate the flow of visa
certifications. 121
III. THE LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE
INTERIM REGULATIONS
Can the EEOC and DOL take the lead in providing protection
to undocumented workers through the use of U visas? This ques-
tion has two dimensions: (1) do these agencies have criminal in-
vestigative jurisdiction?; and (2) should these agencies, in addi-
tion to facilitating individual relief, act as the catalyst for
collective change in their enforcement capacities? The U visa
regulations confirm that both the EEOC and DOL have the au-
thority to issue LECs for victims. This section explores how that
authority arises for each agency. It also analyzes a set of cases in
which labor and employment violations overlap with U visa enu-
merated crimes.
A. The Broad Power of Labor and Employment Agencies to
Investigate U Visa Enumerated Crimes and Provide LEC's
The interim regulations specifically state that agencies such as
the EEOC and the DOL qualify as law enforcement agencies that
can issue LECs. 12 2 The relevant provision states:
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(1) (2000).
120. Id.
121. See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,023 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
214.14(c)(2)(i)).
122. Id. at 53,019.
[Vol. 42:891
IMMIGRANT WORKERS
[A] certifying agency means a Federal, State, or local law enforce-
ment agency, prosecutor, judge, or other authority, that has respon-
sibility for the investigation or prosecution of a qualifying crime or
criminal activity. This definition includes agencies that have crimi-
nal investigative jurisdiction in their respective areas of expertise,
including, but not limited to, child protective services, the [EEOC]
and the [DOL. 123
The regulations broadly define the parameters of an investiga-
tion or prosecution, stating that the clause "investigation or
prosecution" means "the detection or investigation of a qualifying
crime or criminal activity" in addition to "the prosecution, convic-
tion, or sentencing of the perpetrator of the qualifying crime or
criminal activity."'24 This definition is key because it means that
an agency such as the EEOC that does not have explicit criminal
prosecutorial powers can still investigate what would be consid-
ered a crime or criminal activity, even if no formal prosecution
arises out of the investigation. More importantly, the victim who
cooperates would still be eligible for an LEC from the EEOC un-
der this interpretation. Because the EEOC's charge includes
broad investigatory powers in its pursuit of discrimination claims,
the agency is well-placed to protect victims who come forward to
vindicate all of their rights, whether criminal or civil.
There may be an argument that only criminal law enforcement
agencies with criminal prosecutorial authority have jurisdiction
and authority to issue LECs. In the face of such an argument,
this article provides legal analysis to support the interpretation
that the EEOC and the DOL are among those considered proper
law enforcement agencies under the Act. Similar state and local
labor and employment government agencies should also be con-
sidered law enforcement agencies because they have similar in-
terests in protecting workplace victims regardless of immigration
status.
Both the EEOC and the DOL have civil investigative authority
over cases which overlap with the crimes enumerated in the U
visa provisions. The EEOC's investigative jurisdiction over work-
place discrimination and harassment, for example, means that
the EEOC has jurisdiction over workplace sexual harassment in-
vestigations, which could involve the enumerated crimes of rape,
123. Id.
124. Id. at 53,020.
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sexual assault, sexual exploitation, or abusive sexual contact. The
EEOC may also investigate discrimination claims that involve in-
voluntary servitude, peonage, trafficking, or obstruction of jus-
tice. The DOL has similar criminal and civil investigative author-
ity. This section reviews the types of cases that necessitate this
authority. It also addresses the possible parameters of the U visa
for immigrants who seek to vindicate their rights in the work-
place.
B. The EEOC and DOL's "Criminal Investigative Jurisdiction"
1. The DOL's Jurisdiction
The DOL enforces the FLSA, which governs minimum and
overtime wages. The DOL has the power to investigate and
prosecute certain labor violations, including wage and hour, child
labor, homework, agricultural labor, and overtime violations. 125
The congressional findings in the FLSA demonstrate the govern-
ment's purpose of lessening the effects of poor labor conditions on
interstate commerce. The findings state:
[Tihe existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the
maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers causes . . . commerce
and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of
the several States. 
126
The FLSA gives DOL investigators the authority to enforce the
wage and hour provisions of the Act, and to seek information
about the employer's intent in its failure to pay proper wages. 127
Importantly, DOL investigators have criminal investigative
power because the statute itself has a criminal penalty provision.
Section 216 of the FLSA states that "[any person who willfully
violates any of the [section 215 provisions] shall upon conviction
thereof be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000, or to impris-
125. See 29 U.S.C. § 211 (2000).
126. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, Pub. Law. No. 110-80 § 2, 52 Stat.
1060, 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000)).
127. 29. U.S.C. § 211(a) (2000).
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onment for not more than six months, or both." 2 ' A finding of
willfulness is in order when "considering all of the facts and cir-
cumstances, the employer knew its conduct was prohibited or
showed reckless disregard for the requirements of the Act."129 In
order to determine willfulness, the DOL can investigate a variety
of employer activities including the sale of goods made in viola-
tion of wage and hour provisions, minimum and overtime viola-
tions, retaliation against complaining employees, child labor vio-
lations, and recordkeeping violations.'3 ° Pursuant to statute and
a series of memorandums of understanding, if the DOL finds vio-
lations that rise to the level of criminal activity, it can turn the
investigation over to the DOJ, the FBI, or the Inspector General
for prosecution.131
The DOL has broad subpoena power as it carries out its inves-
tigations, which the courts can enforce.132 Section 211 of the
FLSA gives the agency the right to "gather data regarding the
wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment
in any industry subject to this [Act]." '133 Its subpoena powers are
as broad as those bestowed upon the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC"), which extend to questioning witnesses and document
production "relating to any matter under investigation." 134
In the last decade or so, the DOL has become increasingly vigi-
lant in policing labor abuses in low-wage industries. The DOL has
taken three important steps that inure to the benefit of low-wage
workers even as they were taken to protect interstate commerce.
In 1995, the DOL Wage and Hour Division issued a directive pri-
oritizing complaints that concern the safety or welfare of workers
on a "worst-first" basis. 135 Such complaints include slavery, peon-
128. Id. § 216.
129. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 1003 (Ellen C. Kearns ed. 1999) [hereinafter
Kearns]; see also 29 C.F.R. § 578.3(c) (2006).
130. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212, 215 (2000).
131. See Kearns, supra note 129, at 102, n.154; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000) (stating that
the DOJ represents the United States where federal government is a party, unless statute
states otherwise).
132. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 211 (2000).
133. Id. § 211a. Section 211 provides, in addition that the DOL may "question such
employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of
this [Act], or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this [Act]." Id.
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 49 (2000) (FTC); 29 U.S.C. § 209 (DOL).
135. Kearns, supra note 129, at 46-47.
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age, or hazardous occupation violations.'36 The DOL has also con-
ducted "directed investigations" of targeted industries with a
reputation for hiring undocumented workers on the theory that
wage and hour violations against this vulnerable group of work-
ers depresses wages. 3 7 Expecting that enforcement will drive
down incentives to hire undocumented workers, the DOL has im-
plemented a strategy to target egregious employers. The DOL's
underlying motivation is to eliminate vulnerable workers from
the workforce so as to eradicate wage and hour violations.13 The
agency has also collaborated with the DOJ's worker exploitation
task force, which is aimed at ferreting out particularly egregious
workplace violations that approximate trafficking or involuntary
servitude. '39
DOL investigators may refer violations of other crimes to ap-
propriate agencies. For example, the DOL signed a memorandum
of understanding with the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice ("INS") (now the DHS) in 1998. It specifies the circumstances
under which the DOL will share information with the INS about
violations of immigration law. The memorandum also prevents
INS from responding with raids when the DOL is conducting
wage and hour violations or when a labor dispute is in pro-
gress. 140 The DOL also has a memorandum of understanding with
the FBI calling for cooperation in criminal violations related to
the Involuntary Servitude and Slavery Act, the Farm Labor Con-
tractor Registration Act, and the FLSA. '
After the Hoffman decision, the DOL issued a statement of its
intention to continue to protect undocumented workers from ex-
ploitative labor practices on the theory that such protection keeps
employers from hiring undocumented workers. The DOL website
addresses Hoffman, noting its negligible effect on DOL enforce-
ment activities:
136. Id. at 47.
137. Id. at 48.
138. Id. at 48-49.
139. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Trafficking in Persons and Worker Exploitation Task Force,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/tpwetf.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
140. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., Dep't of Justice, and the Employment Standards Admin., Dep't of Labor (Nov. 23,
1998), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whatsnew/whd/mou/nov98mou.htm.
141. Kearns, supra note 129, at 51-52 (citing DEP'T OF LABOR, FIELD OPERATIONS
HANDBOOK § 50f17 (1983)).
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The Supreme Court's decision does not mean that undocumented
workers do not have rights under other U.S. labor laws. In Hoffman
Plastics, the Supreme Court interpreted only one law, the NLRA.
The DOL does not enforce that law.... The Department's Wage and
Hour Division will continue to enforce the FLSA and MSPA [Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act] without regard to
whether an employee is documented or undocumented. Enforcement
of these laws is distinguishable from ordering back pay under the
NLRA. 1
42
The DOL has both the will and the authority to determine
whether facts underlying low-wage worker abuses rise to the
level of criminal intent. Violations of the FLSA extend to activi-
ties that are similar enough to the enumerated U visa violations
to merit DOL law enforcement investigation.
2. The EEOC's Criminal Investigative Jurisdiction
The EEOC has investigative powers similar to the DOL and
even broader remedial authority. Because the EEOC shares both
investigative and prosecutorial powers with the DOJ, however,
the EEOC must turn over to the DOJ's Civil Rights Division in-
vestigations that reach criminal proportions. That the two de-
partments share this duty within the context of employment dis-
crimination does not detract from the EEOC's mission of
investigating both civil and criminal activities arising out of the
same set of facts.
The EEOC also has broad administrative subpoena power. Sec-
tion 709(a) of Title VII states:
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under [§ 706],
the Commission or its designated representative shall at all reason-
able times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or pro-
ceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices cov-
ered by this [title] and is relevant to the charge under investiga-
tion. 
14 3
As long as an underlying charge
142. DEP'T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #48: APPLICATION OF U.S. LABOR LAwS TO IMMI-
GRANT WORKERS: EFFECT OF HOFFMAN PLASTICS DECISION ON LAWS ENFORCED BY THE
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/
whd/whdfs48.htm [hereinafter FACT SHEET # 481.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (2000).
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identiflies] the groups of persons that [the EEOC] has reason to be-
lieve have been discriminated against, the categories of employment
positions from which they have been excluded, the methods by which
the discrimination may have been effected, and the periods of time in
which [the EEOC] suspects the discrimination to have been prac-
ticed, 4
the subpoena should be valid. 1
45
The EEOC's subpoena power is important because it facilitates
the obtainment of information for investigation as well as subse-
quent prosecution of a claim. The scope of the EEOC subpoena
determines the amount and type of information that may be
gathered, and may even be broader than the claims ultimately
submitted to a court. 146 The issuance of a subpoena subject to an
investigation at the point that the EEOC suspects a violation
means that once a cooperative victim witness makes an allega-
tion, the agency may follow up on the allegation by seeking in-
formation from the employer. 147 As long as the information that
the EEOC seeks is relevant and material to the underlying
charges, the agency's subpoena power is valid. 4 ' Therefore, if a
worker alleges facts that underlie an enumerated crime then the
EEOC has the power to investigate that crime.
As the cases discussed below illustrate, many of the situations
that the EEOC investigates parallel the enumerated crimes of the
U visa provisions. 14' The key question for investigation purposes
is whether the relevance and materiality required to exercise
subpoena power are broad enough to cover the elements of the ac-
tivities that make them criminal-arguably they are. For exam-
ple, in a rape charge involving discrimination, the EEOC will
need to investigate facts concerning the rape. Or, for example, the
facts underlying a discrimination claim may be the same facts
144. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 73 (1984).
145. See, e.g., id. at 65.
146. See, e.g., BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 1726-27 (C. Geoffrey Weinch et al. eds. 2007).
147. See Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers Int'l, 860 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating
that suspicion of violation can trigger agency subpoena power).
148. EEOC v. United Air Lines, Inc., 287 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2002). The EEOC can
enforce its subpoena as long as it is within the agency's authority and is not too indefinite.
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Tempel Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1987)). The subpoena
must also "throw light upon the correctness of the return." Id. (quoting U.S. v. Arthur
Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 n.ll (1984)).
149. See infra notes 154-78 and accompanying text.
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underlying an involuntary servitude claim. 5 ' Because the
EEOC's purpose involves serving the public interest in eradicat-
ing discriminatory practices, its subpoena power has been inter-
preted quite broadly. 151
C. Employment and Labor Cases Involving U Visa Enumerated
Criminal Activities
The cases that the EEOC and the DOL have pursued on behalf
of immigrant workers parallel several of the enumerated catego-
ries for which U visa protection is available. These include in-
stances of trafficking, peonage, sexual harassment, rape, sexual
assault, and obstruction of justice. Debt peonage and involuntary
servitude, for example, correspond to FLSA violations related to
minimum wage or overtime payment. For example, the FLSA re-
quires that employers keep track of the hours worked by employ-
ees on a weekly basis.'52 In an extreme case, the employer fails to
pay her sweatshop workers at least the minimum wage per hour
for work performed. DOL investigators have the power to investi-
gate the length of time of the violation, the intent of the employer,
and whether the employer threatened the employee to keep him
from reporting violations.'53 The set of cases discussed here, while
not exhaustive, provides an adequate understanding of the prob-
lems the U visa can relieve as part of an overall remedy for work-
place victims.
1. Trafficking
In one example of an EEOC investigation laying the foundation
for a U visa remedy, the agency filed suit for sex discrimination
against a poultry processor. In 2002, the agency settled EEOC v.
150. Such was the case in Chellen v. John Pickle Co., discussed in detail below. See in-
fra notes 158-78 and accompanying text. There the employer threatened the workers with
deportation when they began to complain about their conditions. The company used the
local police to intimidate the employees into submission. The company also tried to put a
group of workers on a plane home to show workers the consequences of complaining about
their conditions. Even though the plaintiffs had legal status, they were so uninformed of
their workplace rights that they rightfully feared they would lose their legal immigration
status should they lose employment sponsorship. The stigma of undocumented status ac-
tually kept them in their slave-like conditions longer than they should have endured.
151. See LINDEMANN, supra note 146, at 1727-29.
152. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.110 (2007).
153. See id. §§ 211(a), 215(a)(3).
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DeCoster, a lawsuit alleging that a class of Mexican female poul-
try plant workers were trafficked into the country.1 4 Workers
complained of repeated rape and sexual harassment by supervi-
sors and coworkers."'5 The trafficked workers were then allegedly
threatened with termination, deportation, and further harass-
ment if they complained or cooperated with the EEOC's investi-
gation. 56 In addition to settling the suit for $1,525,000, the
EEOC cooperated with federal agencies and local law enforce-
ment to obtain T visas and eventual permanent residency for the
plaintiffs. 157 The sexual harassment and rape claims, as well as
the retaliation/obstruction of justice claims, are forms of criminal
activity for which U visa, in addition to T visa, protection is avail-
able.
Chellen v. John Pickle Co. illustrates even more directly the in-
terplay between immigration law, criminal activity, and employ-
ment and labor law violations.' There, the EEOC and a group of
Indian plaintiffs sued a Tulsa-based petrochemical company for
violations of both Title VII and the FLSA. '59 The company had re-
cruited East Indian workers to the United States to work with its
business interests in the Middle East. 6 ° The company claimed it
was bringing the already skilled workers into the United States
to train with the company so that they could work faster, more ef-
ficiently, and learn about the American work ethic. 6 ' An Indian
154. Complaint at 1, EEOC v. DeCoster, No. C02-3077MWB (N.D. Iowa Sept. 26,
2002); see also Press Release, EEOC and DeCoster Farms Settle Complaint for $1,525,000
(Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-30-02-b.html [hereinafter EEOC
Press Release #1].
155. DeCoster, at *3.
156. Id.
157. Id.; see also EEOC Press Release #1, supra note 154.
158. See 344 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1278-91 (N.D. Okla. 2004); see also Chellen v. John
Pickle Co., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (describing the damages stage of the
litigation). The case was litigated in the post-Hoffman era when federal agencies were as-
sessing the effects of Hoffman on their ability to protect undocumented workers. See, e.g.,
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION DIRECTIVE 915.002, RESCISSION OF
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS UNDER
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (2002), available at httpJ/www.eeoc.gov/pol
icy/docs/undoc-rescind.html [hereinafter RECISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (reiter-
ating that the Hoffman decision did not "call[ ] into question the settled principle that un-
documented workers are covered by the federal employment discrimination statutes"
while at the same time rescinding the guidance with respect to available remedies); FACT
SHEET #48, supra note 142.
159. Chellen, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1279.
160. Id. at 1280.
161. Id. at 1281.
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recruiter charged the employees large sums of money for the op-
portunity to work in the United States.162 They were told that
they would be getting permanent work in the United States.163
The recruiting company sought B1 or B2 business visitor visas for
them, rather than the H2B visa, which would take longer to ac-
quire.164 The recruiter then created a contract with the John
Pickle Co. under which Pickle would pay the recruiter "training"
wages for the employees' work. 165 The wages were then deposited
into employees' accounts in India. 166
Once the workers arrived in the United States, they were
forced to perform work that had nothing to do with their welding
and steel fabrication skills. They spent time performing janitorial
duties, kitchen duties, and yard work. 167 They were also assigned
duties such as sandblasting, painting, and insulation work, all of
which are typically assigned to the least skilled and lowest paid
employees. 16' The workers lived and ate on company premises. 16 9
The company required the workers to convert a warehouse into
a dormitory space for their living arrangements. 170 The company
locked up the Indian workers' passports, visas, airline tickets,
and entry/departure documents and required the workers to seek
permission before leaving the company premises. 17' The company
told the workers that they could face arrest, investigation, or de-
portation if they left the property without proper documenta-
tion. 172 It also posted a guard at the main gate and a notice in the
dormitory warning the workers that failure to seek permission
before leaving the premises could lead to return to India. 17' When
some workers did escape, the company threatened the rest of the
workers with deportation. 174 It warned the workers that depar-
ture from the company was a "strict violation of your U.S. entry
162. Id. at 1280.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1282.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1282-83.
167. Id. at 1284.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1285.
170. Id. at 1284.
171. Id. at 1286.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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visa and makes you subject to criminal prosecution."'75 After a
group of plaintiffs submitted a letter complaining of their status
and working conditions, the company attempted to send some of
the workers back to India. After the company sought local law en-
forcement support, a local car accompanied the workers to the
airport. The company's planned "private deportation" failed only
because the DHS intervened. 176 After finally leaving the premises
en masse, the plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining T visas.177 They
are now working as skilled welders making almost twenty dollars
per hour. 17
8
These workers are the quintessential exploitable workforce.
They arrive in the United States under false or fraudulent prom-
ises, are threatened with deportation or detention if they com-
plain or try to leave, and are involuntarily held in isolation in a
foreign land without access to information about their rights.
This represents the clearest example of the type of victim for
whom relief should be available and whom government labor and
employment agencies should have a duty to protect. The EEOC
likely investigated all of the underlying facts of this case as it de-
veloped its own discrimination claim. Presumably, the DOL also
had the opportunity to investigate the criminal elements of the
plaintiffs' FLSA claims. Both agencies are integral to the eradica-
tion of labor exploitation in the workplace. Federal law enforce-
ment certification is a necessary predicate to a U visa, which ul-
timately offers the opportunity to regain leverage in the
workplace so that employees can fight such exploitation on a
more level playing field.
2. Peonage/Involuntary Servitude
As with trafficking, the facts of debt peonage and involuntary
servitude cases can provide the basis for a discrimination or wage
claim. The involuntary servitude provision in the U visa extends
to certain FLSA violations for nonpayment of wages. Involuntary
servitude is considered a federal crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1584.179
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1287. It is unclear which agency signed the LEC for the plaintiffs' T visa ap-
plications.
178. Id.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 ("Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involuntary servitude
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The DOJ provides some guidance on how § 1584 should be inter-
preted:
[Involuntary servitude is] hold[ing] a person in a condition of slavery,
that is, a condition of compulsory service or labor against his/her will
... by actual force, threats of force, or threats of legal coercion. Sec-
tion 1584 also prohibits compelling a person to work against his/her
will by creating a "climate of fear" through the use of force, the
threat of force, or the threat of legal coercion ... which is sufficient
to compel service against a person's will. 1
80
One example of legal coercion is a threat to call immigration of-
ficials if an employee refuses to work. 1 ' The Supreme Court has
affirmed that threats of deportation in the workplace could be
considered a form of slavery or involuntary servitude. In United
States v. Kozminski, Justice O'Connor noted that "it is possible
that threatening ... an immigrant with deportation could consti-
tute the threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servi-
tude."'82
Involuntary servitude includes forcing or coercing employees to
work without pay or without adequate pay. In their investigative
capacity, DOL officials can seek information about the extent to
which nonpayment is an issue among employees. 18 3 If investiga-
or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or
brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If death results from the violation of this section,
or if the violation includes kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse
or the attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, the defendant
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.")
180. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, FORCED LABOR, and SEX TRAF-
FICKING STATUTES ENFORCED, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/1581fin.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2008) [hereinafter DOJ INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE].
181. Id.
182. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948 (1988). Other courts have followed
this precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638, 640, 645 (9th Cir. 2006) (hold-
ing that federal government had jurisdiction to convict defendant who was accused of hold-
ing workers in involuntary servitude in part by threatening deportation); United States. v.
Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128, 1130-32 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding involuntary servitude convic-
tion where employer forced worker to work in restaurant and at home on threat of depor-
tation); Humphries v. Various Federal USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 944, 946 (5th Cir.
1999) (reversing involuntary servitude claim dismissal in which plaintiff claimed that INS
and FBI made several "threats of deportation if he did not continue to work for them");
United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1004-05 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding conviction of in-
voluntary servitude where employer threatened domestic worker with deportation); Kimes
v. United States, 939 F.2d 776, 777 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding involuntary servitude con-
viction based in part on deportation threats).
183. See, e.g., Viciedo v. New Horizons Computer Learning Ctr. of Columbus, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 886, 890 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
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tors find that employers willfully and purposefully failed to pay
workers and intended to withhold payment before the work
started, investigators have the right to pursue criminal viola-
tions. 8
4
In Bureerong v. Uvawas, a group of immigrants sued their
sweatshop owner for wage and hour violations incurred as a re-
sult of an involuntary servitude scheme. 8 5 The sweatshop owners
held their workers captive in an El Monte, California apartment
without allowing them any freedoms.' Not only were they kept
under lock and key behind gated doors, but they were also threat-
ened physically and psychologically."8 ' Julie Su, one of the attor-
neys for the workers, described their captivity:
The workers labored over eighteen hours a day in a compound en-
closed by barbed wire. Armed guards imposed discipline. Crowded
eight to ten into bedrooms built for two, rats crawled over them dur-
ing their few precious hours of sleep .... Their captors, who super-
vised garment production and enforced manufacturer specifications
and deadlines, ruled through fear and intimidation. Workers were
forbidden to make unmonitored phone calls or write uncensored let-
ters, and were forced to purchase goods from their captors, who
charged four to five times the market price for food, toiletries, and
other daily necessities. Living under the constant threat of harm to
themselves and to their families in Thailand, they labored over sew-
ing machines in dark garages and poorly lit rooms, making clothes
for brand name manufacturers sold in some of the biggest retail
stores in America. 1
8 8
Bureerong exemplifies the type of intimidation and legal coercion
that many immigrant workers experience when they complain
about workplace conditions or pay.
The involuntary servitude parallels exist for Title VII as well
as for the FLSA. In EEOC v. Trans Bay Steel Co., a recently set-
tled case, a group of Thai welders were recruited to the United
States and held in involuntary servitude.'8 9 They were told they
184. 29 C.F.R. § 790.4(a) n.17 (2006).
185. See 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
186. Id. at 1459-60.
187. Julie Su, El Monte Thai Garment Workers: Slave Sweatshops, NO SWEAT:
FASHION, FREE TRADE AND THE RTS. OF GARMENT WORKERS, 1997, available at http://
sweatshopwatch.org/index.php?s=68.
188. Id.
189. Consent Decree at 2, EEOC v. Trans Bay Steel Co., 2:06-CV-07766-CAS-JTL (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 8, 2006).
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would be arrested or turned over to immigration authorities if
they tried to leave the premises. Although they were sponsored
for skilled welding work, they were forced in some cases to work
for Thai restaurants or perform other menial work. The court en-
tered a consent decree in the case, ordering, among other things,
employer sponsorship in the immigration system so that immi-
grants could continue to work in the United States.'90 These cases
are also ripe for EEOC investigation where the plaintiffs claim of
differential treatment or discriminatory employment practices. In
such cases, the threat of legal coercion may arise as retaliation in
the employment discrimination investigation.
3. Rape, Sexual Assault, and Sexual Harassment
Cases in which rape, sexual assault, or abusive sexual contact
are alleged fall within the realm of sexual harassment, which the
EEOC has the authority and responsibility to target and investi-
gate. The EEOC must investigate charges of sexual harassment
and, as a federal agency, may refer to the DOJ or some other
criminal enforcement agency any signs of criminal activity it
finds during its investigation.
Other forms of sexual harassment, such as quid pro quo har-
assment, sexual advances, gender-based animosity, and sexually
charged hostile environments, should trigger an EEOC investiga-
tion to determine whether the activity rises to the level of an
enumerated sex crime or similar criminal activity. The key com-
ponent of such harassment arises in the particularly vulnerable
situation of newly arrived immigrant women.' 9' A recent study
found that ninety percent of farm worker women suffered sexual
harassment on the job.' 92 Women in other low-wage professions
have similar experiences. 9 3 Several recently settled EEOC cases
190. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Resolves Slavery and Human Trafficking Suit
Against Trans Bay Steel for an Estimated $1 Million (Dec. 8, 2006), available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/press/12-8-06.html.
191. See, e.g., X6chitl Castafieda & Patricia Zavella, Changing Constructions of Sexual-
ity and Risk: Migrant Mexican Women Farmworkers in California, 8 J. LATIN AM. AN-
THROPOLOGY 126, 126-27, 141-42 (2003).
192. See Southern Poverty Law Center, New Project Aims for Harassment-Free Work-
place, SPLCENTER.ORG, Mar. 14, 2006, http//:www.splcenter.org/legal/news/article.jsp?site
.area=1&aid=169 (noting that immigrant women in other workplaces face sexual harass-
ment issues).
193. See id. (noting that immigrant women in other workplaces also face sexual har-
assment issues).
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illustrate that the intersection of immigration status and sexual
harassment in the workplace proves particularly egregious for
women in low-wage industries. In EEOC v. Grace Culinary Sys-
tems, Inc., the EEOC settled a claim alleging that twenty-two La-
tino women in a food processing company were sexually harassed
over a period of several years. 94 They allegedly suffered sexual
groping and requests for sex, and those who refused were given
menial tasks or more difficult assignments. 195 Other women who
refused were allegedly fired."1
In DeCoster, discussed above in the trafficking context, the
EEOC investigated and found sufficient evidence to sue the com-
pany for sexual harassment, including rape and sexual abuse. 197
The underlying sex crimes were investigated in order to uncover
sufficient facts for a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile
work environment. Moreover, the company allegedly "threatened
retaliation if [the plaintiffs] complained of such conduct." 9 ' The
workers ultimately received T visas because they had been traf-
ficked into the United States in addition to being sexually as-
saulted. Now that the U visa interim regulation is in place, they
can provide the same kind of protection without the need to prove
the elements of severe forms of trafficking. 99
Women in sexual harassment situations do not have to be un-
documented in order for intimidation and coercion to manifest
194. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Obtains $1 Million for Low-Wage Workers Who
Were Sexually Harassed at Food Processing Plant (June 1, 2000), available at http://www.
eeoc.gov/press/6-1-00.html [hereinafter EEOC Press Release #2].
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
198. EEOC Press Release #1, supra note 154.
199. See 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,037 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
214.14(b)); see also infra Part IV.C. Other examples of sexual harassment cases in which
U visas could be made available to a group of women include EEOC v. Harris Farms, Inc.,
No. 1:02-cv-06199, 2005 WL 2071741, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2005) and EEOC v. Tani-
mura & Antle, Inc., No. 5:99-cv-20088 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1999). In EEOC v. Harris Farms,
the EEOC received a $994,000 verdict for the plaintiff in a sexual harassment/rape case.
The defendant in this case attempted to discover the immigration status of the plaintiff at
trial. In EEOC v. Tanimura & Antle, the EEOC charged supervisors in a lettuce growing
operation with sexual assault and quid pro quo sexual harassment of its female agricul-
tural workers. Latina agricultural workers were required to perform sexual favors in re-
turn for keeping their jobs. The company settled the case for $1.9 million and agreed to
conduct extensive anti-discrimination training in its operations. Press Release, EEOC,
EEOC and Tanimura and Antle Settle Sexual Harassment Case in the Agricultural Indus-
try (Feb. 23, 1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-23-99.html [hereinafter EEOC
Press Release #3].
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themselves.2 °° Currently, in a mixed-status workplace, the EEOC
may choose to represent women who have legal status in order to
avoid any immigration-related discovery issues that may arise.
The reality, however, is that if intimidation and coercion exist for
those with legal status, the threat is exponentially greater for
those without. In the recently settled case of EEOC v. Caesars
Entertainment, Inc., the EEOC sued on behalf of a class of Latino
kitchen workers who were sexually harassed by supervisors.2 °1
The EEOC claimed that the women were subject to repeated and
severe sexual harassment-the type that rises to the level of
criminal activity.2 2 The EEOC charged the supervisors with forc-
ing women to have sex under the threat of firing. 203
The threat of deportation would have lingered with these
women even if the named plaintiffs had employment authoriza-
tion in the United States. All of the women were monolingual
Spanish speakers and had trouble communicating with upper
level managers who supervised the offending supervisors.20 4 The
supervisors took advantage of what they perceived as the victims'
inability to defend themselves because of their tenuous immigra-
tion status and lack of English proficiency.2 5 They allegedly
forced the women to engage in sexual intercourse at work and
performed other lewd acts with them. °6 When the plaintiffs did
complain, they suffered retaliation through demotions, wage
losses, discipline, further harassment, and discharge.2 7 Anna
Park, the EEOC regional counsel who oversaw the settlement,
noted that "[iin a case like this where many of the workers were
monolingual Spanish speakers, victims of sexual harassment of-
ten feel further isolated, marginalized, and unable to vindicate
their rights."20 '
200. The U visa and law enforcement certification can still be useful in these cases. See
infra section V.A.
201. Complaint at 1-3, EEOC v. Caesars Entm't, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-0427-LRH-PAL (D.
Nev. Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Caesars Complaint].
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Press Release, EEOC, Caesars Palace to Pay $850,000 for Sexual Harassment and
Retaliation (Aug. 20, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/8-20-07.html [hereinaf-
ter EEOC Press Release #4].
205. See id.
206. Caesars Complaint, supra note 201, at 4.
207. EEOC Press Release #4, supra note 204.
208. Id.
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It is apparent both in the complaint and in the ultimate resolu-
tion of the case that the EEOC had to investigate facts that could
have led to criminal charges. Therefore, plaintiffs without immi-
gration status are eligible for U visa status by cooperating with
the EEOC in the final resolution of the case.2 °9 Caesars Palace il-
lustrates how a victim that has legal status may nonetheless be
coerced into exploitative situations based on fears for family or
loved ones.210 U visa availability and the EEOC LECs are neces-
sary protection mechanisms in these cases.
4. Obstruction of Justice
The "obstruction of justice" violations enumerated in the U visa
provision parallel FLSA and Title VII prohibitions against work-
place retaliation in the form of abuse of the legal process.211 Many
of the cases that the EEOC and the DOL investigate involve alle-
gations of retaliation by employers who threaten to call immigra-
tion officials and risk deportation of employees who complain to
authorities about workplace violations.2 2 The DOL's investiga-
tive power in this area is broad because the DOL seeks to protect
workers who come forward with complaints and who can help
prosecute DOL violations.213 In the immigrant community, one of
the ways that unscrupulous employers can take advantage of the
legal system is to misrepresent legal consequences by threatening
a complaining worker with deportation once a worker has filed
charges. If the threat rises to the level of abuse of the legal proc-
209. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2000) (providing the terms for eligibility for U
visa status).
210. See, e.g., Saucedo, supra note 18, at 970 (listing factors that prevent even docu-
mented workers from complaining at work); Saucedo, supra note 6, at 315 ("The current
immigration law framework engenders fear in a population that does not understand im-
migration law and its evolving standards.").
211. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U))(iii) (2000), with 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000).
212. See, e.g., Gomez v. F & T Int'l, LLC, 842 N.Y.S. 2d 298, 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(refusing to allow defendant to seek information about plaintiffs immigration status after
plaintiffs filed wage claim because to do so would intimidate plaintiffs from pursuing a
legitimate claim); Complaint at 1, 3, EEOC v. Glenview Car Wash, No. 1:05-cv-05568
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005) (alleging retaliation against male employees by subjecting them
to termination); Consent Decree at 3, EEOC v. DeCoster, No. 3:02-cv-03077-MWB (N.D.
Iowa Oct. 3, 2002) (alleging retaliation against Mexican workers); Consent Decree 2,
EEOC v. Holiday Inn Express Hotel & Suites, Inc., 0:00-cv-00034-DSD-JMM (D. Minn.
Jan. 11, 2000) (alleging retaliatory reporting of employees of Mexican nationality to the
INS).
213. See 29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (2000).
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ess, DOL investigators can pursue criminal charges for retalia-
tion under the FLSA.214
The U visa interim regulations state that, for U visa purposes,
a victim of obstruction of justice, and of similar "victimless"
crimes, is an alien who
has been directly and proximately harmed by the perpetrator of the
witness tampering, obstruction of justice, or perjury; and ... [t]here
are reasonable grounds to conclude that the perpetrator committed
the [offense], at least in principal part, as a means: (1) [tlo avoid or
frustrate efforts to investigate, arrest, prosecute, or otherwise bring
to justice the perpetrator for other criminal activity, or (2) [t]o fur-
ther the perpetrator's abuse or exploitation of or undue control over
the [alien] through manipulation of the legal system. 
2 15
This definition encompasses the type of activity endemic in low-
wage labor and employment discrimination cases in which immi-
grants file claims and then are asked for proof of valid immigra-
tion status in order to keep their jobs. These retaliatory activities
are arguably covered in the realm of activities that make a plain-
tiff a victim of witness tampering, obstruction of justice, or per-
jury, which are all U visa enumerated crimes.
The EEOC's experiences with retaliation cases demonstrate
how employers tend to utilize immigration status in exploring
other discrimination-based complaints such as sexual harass-
ment. The facts in EEOC v. The Restaurant Company show how
undocumented employees respond to the implicit threats of de-
portation.216 In that case, Mariano Centeno, a Perkins manager,
made sexual advances to Maria Torres several times over the
course of her employment. 217 Torres tried to resist his advances.
After she complained to the restaurant's general manager, she
said that she feared that Centeno would turn her in to immigra-
tion officials and have her deported if she complained.218
214. Id. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(a), 1855(a) (2000).
215. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmi-
grant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,037 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at C.F.R. §
214.14(a)(14)(ii)).
216. See EEOC v. The Restaurant Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D. Minn. 2006).
217. Id. at 1086.
218. Id. If an investigation of the allegation proved that Centeno made such threats,
the company could be liable for obstruction of justice at the very least, or liability for
forced labor. Because these facts were not developed in the case, however, it is not clear
whether the EEOC conducted such an investigation.
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The company placed Torres on a leave of absence until she
could prove legal status, and it began to question her legal status
during discovery after she pressed her sexual harassment claim
in court. 21 9 At that point, the company crossed the line, taking
advantage of her fear of deportation by forcing her to prove her
status in retaliation for pressing her claims. Under the current U
visa regulatory scheme, this amounts to obstruction of justice as
defined by the interim regulations. 22' First, an allegation was
made that her supervisor used her illegal status to manipulate
her into sexual exploitation.22' Second, the company sought dis-
covery regarding her immigration status.222 In this case, the
EEOC was granted a protective order that prohibited the restau-
rant from seeking information from Torres about her immigration
status.223 Under the current visa regulations, as long as the
EEOC investigated the obstruction of justice or forced labor alle-
gations, it could provide an LEC for Torres's U visa application.224
Even if the threat of deportation does not rise to the level of
forced labor, it can subordinate an employee to such a degree that
the employee might as well be coerced into continuing to work for
the employer. Psychological coercion in the immigrant workplace
is a phenomenon that has not received much attention in the le-
gal or social science literature. Sociologists have observed how
employers seek out immigrant workers because they are more
subservient due, in part, to their fears of deportation. In one
study, sociologists Waldinger and Lichter found that employers
explicitly referred to their preference for undocumented immi-
grants who were afraid to resist coercion because of their
status. 225 This preference can surface, often subtly, in how an
employer signals to an employee that she seeks compliance and
submissiveness.226
219. Id.
220. See Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,014-15.
221. See The Restaurant Co., 448 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
222. See id. at 1086-87.
223. Id. at 1088.
224. See Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,014.
225. See ROGER WALDINGER & MICHAEL I LiCHTER, How THE OTHER HALF WORKS:
IMMIGRATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR 160-61 (2003).
226. Id. at 156-57.
[Vol. 42:891
IMMIGRANT WORKERS
Even less egregious cases, however, can amount to obstruction
of justice. For example, in EEOC v. City of Joliet, the court
granted the EEOC a protective order prohibiting the employer
from compelling the plaintiffs to complete and sign federal immi-
gration employment, or 1-9, forms. 227 The court was persuaded by
the fact that, although the employer had been in business since
1989, it had never required its employees to fill out 1-9 forms at
the beginning of their employment. 2 8 The court was not per-
suaded by the employer's argument that when it conducted an
audit after charges were filed, it found that the I-9's for all of its
employees were missing and that it was simply trying to comply
with the law. 229 The court found the timing too close to be coinci-
dental,23 ° noting that the employer's actions would be
interpreted by any reasonable undocumented plaintiff or class mem-
ber as nothing less than the first step towards being discharged, re-
ported to the Department of Homeland Security as an undocumented
alien, or both .... The most onerous consequence will be ... loss of
job, arrest, detention and ultimately deportation. The intimidating
effect of such conduct is hard to exaggerate.
231
In granting the EEOC's motion for a protective order, the court
implied that allowing the employer to ask about immigration
status so long after the employee was hired was tantamount to
obstruction of justice.2 32 As the court noted, "[tihis step [of requir-
ing I-9's] alone might be sufficient to end the lawsuit regardless of
its merits."233 To the extent, then, that an employer's, or its at-
torney's, tactics include intimidation through investigation of
immigration status, the EEOC or the DOL would have the foun-
dation for an investigation that could result in a U visa for the
targeted employees.
Of course, not all such cases will rise to that level. In some
cases, either the underlying claim is not similar enough to the
enumerated U visa crimes, or the employer's attorney has made
the argument that immigration status is necessary to pursue a
227. See EEOC. v. City of Joliet, 239 F.R.D. 490, 491-92, 494 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
228. Id. at 492.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 493.
232. See id. at 493-94.
233. Id. at 493.
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claim.234 While this argument has been dismissed repeatedly by
courts in employment discrimination and wage cases,235 there
may be some legitimate reason related to the claim that an em-
ployer could seek an employee's immigration status. In that case,
the court could grant discovery and it would be difficult to prove
an obstruction of justice claim.
Even if the court grants a protective order against an employer
seeking immigration status information after a workplace com-
plaint has been lodged, an obstruction of justice investigation
does not automatically follow. As ICE raids increase in number,
employers will need to comply with immigration enforcement ef-
forts to rid the workplace of undocumented workers. An employer
that is simply responding to ICE requests in seeking immigration
status information should be shielded from obstruction of justice
investigations in an EEOC or DOL investigation of a workplace
dispute. Similarly, if DHS rules are ultimately implemented, an
employer may need to act in the face of Social Security no-match
letters by requiring an employee to offer supplemental or cor-
rected information or risk employer sanctions. If the employer is
acting solely to comply with these federal agencies, the employer
should not face an investigation. This type of situation is distin-
guishable from the Joliet case, in which the timeframe for the
employer's investigation was too close to the workplace complaint
to disavow intent to intimidate complaining employees.236
On the other hand, courts are increasingly convinced that the
Supreme Court's Hoffman decision denying back pay and other
remedies to an undocumented immigrant does not apply to dis-
crimination and wage cases. 237 Thus, as precedent builds, an em-
234. See, e.g., Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 502 (W.D. Mich.
2005) (concluding that the plaintiffs' immigration status is not relevant in showing stand-
ing or damages).
235. See, e.g., id. at 503 (granting protective order preventing employer from conduct-
ing discovery with respect to plaintiffs immigration status); Flores v. Amigon, 223 F.
Supp. 2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting the plaintiffs motion for protective order).
236. See Joliet, 239 F.R.D at 492.
237. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (doubting that Hoffman
applies to Title VII cases); Singh v. Jutla, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that employer who calls INS in retaliation for employee filing a wage and hour
claim violated the FLSA); Flores, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 464 (granting a protective order pro-
hibiting discovery into the plaintiffs immigration status because Hoffman was not rele-
vant to claims for unpaid wages under the FLSA); Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207
F. Supp. 2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (questioning the applicability of Hoffman to the
FLSA and denying the employer's request for discovery of immigration status); Flores v.
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ployer that attempts to seek a plaintiffs immigration status after
a claim is made may leave itself open to obstruction of justice in-
vestigations in workplace disputes.
These cases illustrate the extent to which the EEOC must in-
vestigate facts that also support allegations of criminal activity,
even when the EEOC does not have a direct mandate to pursue
criminal charges in federal court. More important to immigrant
workers, because sexual harassment and immigration status col-
lide in particularly egregious ways on account of the power dy-
namics between supervisors and workers in low-wage indus-
238tries, workers need protection outside the remedies of
injunctive relief and monetary damages. In order to truly effect
the purpose of Title VII and of the FLSA, employment and labor
law enforcement agencies must seek to provide legal protection to
individuals who will then be able to reenter the workplace with
some degree of leverage to counteract the unbalanced power dy-
namics for women in low wage industries. The U visa can provide
that kind of remedy and ultimately, legal protection, in the form
of legal status and employment authorization. To the extent that
the EEOC does investigate the possibility of sexual harassment
or assault, it should be amenable to providing the victim with an
LEC, even if it does not ultimately pursue a sexual harassment
claim.
IV. OPERATIONALIZING U VISA PROTECTION
The immigrant civil rights literature contrasts with legal
scholarship surrounding crime and trafficking victims, which
analyzes legal status as the quid pro quo for law enforcement co-
operation.2 39 Civil rights for victim immigrants are not articu-
Albertson's, Inc., No. CV0100515AHM(SHX), 2002 WL 1163623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9,
2002) (holding that Hoffman did not bar undocumented employee from recovering unpaid
wages for work actually performed because "FLSA protections are available to citizens and
undocumented workers alike").
238. See, e.g., William Tamayo, The Role of the EEOC in Protecting the Civil Rights of
Farm Workers, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1079-80 (commenting on the EEOC's need to
reach out to immigrant farm worker women, who are most vulnerable to sexual harass-
ment because of their immigration status, their poverty, and their lack of knowledge,
about their rights); Maria Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and
the Law, 55 MAINE L. REV. 157, 178-79 (noting that although Title VII should protect fe-
male farm workers, the law's focus on one factor at a time ignores the intersectionality of
sex, national origin, and immigration status as the basis for discrimination).
239. Compare Volpp, supra note 98, with Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and
2008]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
lated, as such, within the U visa framework. This is in part be-
cause many rights are traditionally reserved for full members of
our national community.2 40 Non-citizens have less than full rights
because they have less of a claim to full membership.2 41 In the
current paradigm, the protection that comes with U visa nonim-
migrant status is considered less a rights-conferring instrument
than a law-enforcement tool. 242 Consequently, the important con-
nection between U visa protection and the inherent leveraging
power in the workplace that comes with legalization is not ex-
plicit. Nora Demleitner notes that offering legalization in the
form of nonimmigrant visas such as the S, T, and U reinforces
law enforcement's goal of garnering cooperation from tradition-
ally silent immigrant communities.2 43 She argues, moreover, that
this emphasis on law enforcement's goal, rather than the rights-
conferring nature of the protection, creates perverse incentives to
cooperate in order to stay in the country. 244 Because the focus is
not on giving the worker an empowerment tool, workers that are
crime victims continue to seek visas as victims and not as poten-
tial rights bearers. This dynamic continues to discourage empow-
erment strategies such as workplace organizing.2 45 Demleitner
argues that the fact that law enforcement determines which po-
tential applicants have provided information necessary to merit
law enforcement certification of cooperation skews the process,
places too much power in the hands of law enforcement, and leads
to abuses.246
The literature analyzing the rights-conferring functions of le-
galization or citizenship also contrasts with the literature ad-
dressing U visas as part of a protection scheme for domestic or
sex violence victims. Lori Nessel notes that immigration relief,
such as the U visa, which protects women fleeing domestic vio-
lence situations, recognizes the importance of family reunifica-
Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1463-64 (2006).
240. See generally Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of
Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285 (2002) (discussing the relationship between citizenship
and rights).
241. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
242. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (2000).
243. Demleitner, supra note 5, at 1073-75.
244. Id.
245. Volpp, Migrating Identities, supra note 98, at 509.
246. Demleitner, supra note 5, at 1085-86.
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tion.247 U visa provisions, and the accompanying interim regula-
tions, allow for the inclusion of immediate family members in ap-
plications and in subsequent applications for adjustment of status
to permanent residency. Adult U visa recipients may seek deriva-
tive status for their spouses and children.24 Minor U visa recipi-
ents under age twenty-one may seek derivative status for spouse,
children, unmarried siblings under age eighteen at the time of
application, and parents.249 In arguing for similar provisions for
torture victims in asylum law, Nessel concludes that
[uin order for U.S. immigration policies to appear to be humanitarian
in nature, they must be seen as bestowing mercy upon the more de-
serving immigrants.... [I]mmigration legislation aimed at victims of
domestic violence and human trafficking is premised on a view of
women (and children) as innocent victims in need of mercy, including
family reunification. 
250
This perception about the victims on whom legal status is be-
stowed could potentially conflict with the rights-conferring para-
digm of legalization as a right, or a reparation, that grants lever-
age in the workplace to immigrant workers as a class. The latter
may be more threatening than the former; however, the former is
much more collective and less individualistic than the latter. The
legal literature in neither the immigration nor the domestic vio-
lence fields captures the nuances of workplace versus home-based
criminal activity even though both the statute and the regula-
tions contemplate protection for both.2 1 The following section dis-
cusses the power of the U visa as a rights-conferring device for
victims of labor exploitation, one that confers rights that inure to
a class of workers, namely immigrant workers.
247. See Nessel, supra note 5, at 938.
248. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmi-
grant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,039 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
214.14(f)).
249. Id. This type of provision is virtually unique in immigration law, allowing immi-
gration status to flow from a child to a parent and not the other way around. See David B.
Thronson, You Can't Get Here From Here: Toward a More Child-Centered Immigration
Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POLY & L. 58, 62 (2006).
250. Nessel, supra note 5, at 936-37. Nessel also argues that a similar humanitarian
policy in the workplace requires the provision of a special visa for workers to be able to
vindicate their workplace rights. Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Work-
place: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
345, 359-61 (2001).
251. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii) (2000) (making no distinction between workplace
and home-based criminal activity); Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg.
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A. The U Visa As a Tool for Collective Workplace Change
Can the existence of U visa status provide incentive for work-
place organization? There are two underlying questions here.
First, can the U visa be used by a class of workers to protect
against labor exploitation? Second, can the prospect of obtaining
legalization and the protection that legal status affords encourage
immigrant workers to organize in particularly egregious settings?
This is an area where immigrants may, and have, learned from
the experience of the African-American civil rights movement or
from their own organizing experiences from their home countries.
In New Orleans, immigrant workers joined together to challenge
exploitative practices, and at the same time joined with African-
Americans seeking to establish humane labor practices that pro-
tect all workers.252
In especially egregious situations, such as the John Pickle case,
or the Bureerong case, it was not a guarantee of legal status, but
rather the most unbearable conditions, that forced workers to
come forward and complain about labor and employment viola-
tions. There are cases, however, that are between the garden va-
riety labor and employment violations and the especially egre-
gious cases, in which the possibility of a U visa may give a set of
workers added impetus to join together to repel exploitative con-
ditions. Once they have joined, moreover, they create the atmos-
phere for organizing and collective bargaining around other
workplace terms and conditions. The prospect of a collective right
of the brown-collar worker, hired in part because of employer ex-
pectation of subservience and submissiveness, makes the U visa
mechanism an attractive organizing strategy.
Of course, the U visa, as currently configured and used, is
geared toward individuals rather than a group of workers. Each
individual victim must apply for U visa nonimmigrant status, and
must separately cooperate with law enforcement agencies to ful-
fill the requirements of the LEC.25 3 In some instances, such as the
Bureerong case, a group of workers will get visas based on their
53,014, 53,036 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(9) (2007) (same)).
252. See, e.g., Complaint at 2-3, Castellanos v. Decatur Hotels, LLC, No. 06-4340 (E.D.
La. Aug. 24, 2006), available at https://secure.splcenter.orgpdf/dynamic/legal/Decatur-
AmendedComplaint.pdf.
253. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III) (2000).
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individual participation in the investigation and prosecution of
the case.254
Notwithstanding, the purpose of the U visa in protecting work-
ers and empowering them to come forward would be met equally
in the workplace if groups of workers suffering the effects of labor
exploitation were eligible for U visas. Recall that one of the pur-
poses of the U visa is to help law enforcement meet its goals by
encouraging undocumented victims to come forward with infor-
mation that will lead to a prosecution.2 5 In employment dis-
crimination cases, for example, an investigator must not only
take testimony from the complaining victim, but also seek out
corroborative witnesses to testify. 256 Those witnesses are often
afraid to come forward because of the threat of retaliation. For an
undocumented worker, retaliation in the form of discharge has
deeper consequences because the worker must now find a new job
without documents. The possibility of a U visa may help groups of
workers overcome their fears if the process is simplified. If a
group of workers comes forward, for example, they can act in a
representative capacity, just as named plaintiffs do in a class ac-
tion lawsuit. The unnamed plaintiffs can remain in the back-
ground and still be eligible for U visas if they are willing to step
forward at the request of a law enforcement official. In this way,
both purposes of the statute-cooperation and protection-are
met even though not all victims are made available to testify.
B. The U Visa as a Vehicle for State Legislative Protection of
Classes of Workplace Victims
The most obvious form of labor exploitation covered by the U
visa statute and its regulations is trafficking. Trafficking is one of
the enumerated U visa crimes.257 It can be a state offense as well
as a federal one.25 ' While the related T visa requires that a victim
demonstrate that she is the victim of a "severe form of traffick-
ing," the U visa requires that the victim show that she was
254. Su, supra note 6, at 242.
255. Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,014.
256. See EEOC, EEOC's Charge Processing Procedures, http://www.eeoc.gov/charge/
overview-charge-processing.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
257. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(iii) (2000).
258. Id.
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merely the subject of trafficking.2" 9 Because the U visa provision
also covers similar activity, a victim can define trafficking accord-
ing to state law. As many as twenty-five states now have traffick-
ing statutes, some of which cover labor exploitation as a form of
trafficking.26 °
The Nevada legislature recently passed an anti-trafficking law
making it a crime to transport an undocumented person into the
state with the intent to violate any state or federal labor law.26'
This broad definition covers the types of subordination that state
and federal labor laws may address but that do not necessarily
rise to the level of the severe forms of trafficking that the TVPA
targets. For example, the Nevada statute arguably covers in its
trafficking definition a situation in which workers were brought
into the state to perform subminimum wage jobs or were not paid
for their work once completed. The statute also arguably covers
cases in which the employer enticed employees to enter the state
to work in a discriminatory work environment. For example, a
worker brought into the state to suffer workplace sexual harass-
ment could have a trafficking claim. By virtue of its extensive
coverage, state trafficking legislation may provide protections
omitted by the federal trafficking statute. In other words, a
worker can seek legalization through the U visa provisions even
in cases where she cannot demonstrate that she has suffered se-
vere forms of trafficking.
C. The U Visa as the Impetus for Building Creative Alliances
Among Agencies
DeCoster discussed above, exemplifies how U visa protection
can be used proactively by workers and their advocates.262 Recall
that in DeCoster the EEOC investigated and found violations of
anti-discrimination laws arising from the exploitation of vulner-
able immigrant workers.263 ICE recently conducted a raid at the
259. Compare id. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) ("severe form of trafficking"), with id. § 1101(a)
(15)(U)(iii) (listing trafficking as an enumerated crime).
260. See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, REPORT CARD ON STATE ACTION TO
COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING 5 (2007), available at http://www.centerwomenpoli
cy.org/documents/ReportCardonStateActiontoCombatInternationalTrafficking.pdf.
261. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.468 (2007).
262. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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same DeCoster Farm operation the EEOC had sued. 264 During
the raid, more than fifty undocumented workers were arrested
and sent to detention centers across Iowa.265 In lieu of such raids,
especially in workplaces where previous labor and employment
violations have occurred, workers should be able to support ICE
or a governmental employment agency by providing information
that will point them toward particularly egregious employers or
past violators. This type of partnership can secure workers' legal
status and cooperation from law enforcement before the raids oc-
cur. As a result, ICE and labor and employment agencies can
eradicate exploitative employment practices without exposing
workers to deportation threats.
The workplace raids as they are currently conducted exemplify
the short-sightedness of immigration enforcement without the co-
ordination of labor and employment law enforcement agencies. If
a company has committed past violations, the workplace should
be investigated first to determine whether there are violations for
which victims can seek U visa status. At the very least, the EEOC
must be able to investigate the employer's practices once a raid
occurs to determine whether any of the potential deportees are
eligible for crime victim status. This type of protocol is especially
salient in cases like DeCoster where the EEOC has found suffi-
cient cause to file a complaint against the company for activity
that would amount to eligible criminal activity under the U visa
provisions.
Even without a protocol, however, workplace raids should trig-
ger employment and labor violation investigations. Under the U
visa regulations, a cooperating crime victim can seek U visa non-
immigrant status from outside the United States while a removal
proceeding is pending or after a removal order has been issued.266
Even if a crime victim is wrongfully deported after an ICE raid,
that worker conceivably still has the power to seek redress by co-
operating with the EEOC or DOL in an investigation of potential
264. Associated Press, ICE Arrests 51 Workers at DeCoster Egg Farms, CRESTON NEWS
ADVERTISER, Sept. 14, 2007, http://www.crestonnewsadvertiser.com/articles/2007/09/14/
news/state-news/9-14ia-decoster-immigrat3.txt.
265. Id.
266. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Non-
immigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,037 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §
214.14(c)(1)).
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crimes related to labor or employment law violations. 267 This pro-
vision empowers workers transnationally, and should have the
added benefit of facilitating investigations and prosecutions in
particularly egregious cases.
D. Effect of U Visa Status on Discovery Issues: The U Visa as a
Deterrent to Unnecessary Discovery in Workplace Disputes
In those cases where an employer has either threatened an
employee with deportation as part of a workplace dispute or has
retaliated against an employee complaining of labor or employ-
ment discrimination violations, the U visa should be made avail-
able to shield employees from further retaliation or deportation.
It is already unlawful for an employer to call immigration au-
thorities in retaliation for an employee's assertion of labor or em-
ployment rights.2 6' As discussed above, this type of employer ac-
tivity is akin to obstruction of justice or abuse of process, both of
which are enumerated U visa crimes.269
Legal status can make a difference in a worker's perception of
the risk in going forward with a labor or employment claim. The
promise of legal status can assuage a fearful employee facing un-
duly burdensome requests for information about immigration
status during the discovery stages of litigation. Although many
courts refuse to allow employers to seek such information,27 °
267. See id. at 53,037-38 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(1)(ii)).
268. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) (prohibiting retaliation against workers at-
tempting to assert their rights under the FLSA); id. § 158(a)(3) (prohibiting workplace dis-
crimination against employees organizing in the workplace); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000)
(prohibiting retaliation against workers who seek redress for discrimination or who coop-
erate with anti-discrimination efforts); see also Sure-Tan v. N.L.R.B., 467 U.S. 883, 894-96
(1984) (noting that an employer's call to INS about complaining workers during an orga-
nizing drive constituted constructive discharge in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA);
Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R's Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061-62 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (de-
nying motion to dismiss on FLSA suit by an employer who called INS in retaliation for
employee filing a wage and hour claim); Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocu-
mented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 503 (2004) (noting that "[i]t is axiomatic
that employers may not retaliate against their employees for activities protected under
labor and employment laws").
269. See supra text accompanying note 21.
270. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that Hoffman did not apply in Title VII cases and refusing to allow discovery on immigra-
tion status); Galaviz-Zamora v. Brady Farms, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 499, 501-02 (W.D. Mich.
2005) (holding that it was not persuaded that immigration status was relevant to FLSA
and related claims); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464-65 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (hold-
ing that Hoffman does not apply in FLSA actions and granting a protective order from dis-
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other courts have been swayed by the argument that employers
need such information to determine potential liability. 271 Immi-
gration status has become a defense to employment law claims,
especially after the Hoffman decision.272 If information about le-
gal status is pursued during discovery, undocumented claimants
have sought protective orders, refused to answer on Fifth
Amendment grounds, or simply dropped their claims. Sometimes,
the employer will have already retaliated by seeking re-
verification of authorization to work after a claimant has filed a
charge of discrimination or some other labor violation.273
Under the newly issued U visa regulations, the EEOC or the
DOL can now start an investigation surrounding the circum-
stances of the employer's information gathering, and issue a law
enforcement certification when they suspect that the employer
has violated obstruction of justice provisions of the statute. The
commentary to the U visa interim rule defines the victim of an
obstruction of justice, and the related witness tampering and per-
jury crimes, as one who is "harmed when a perpetrator commits
one of the three crimes in order to avoid or frustrate the efforts of
law enforcement authorities."274 Such crimes also involve victims
"who are harmed when the perpetrator uses the legal system to
exploit or impose control over them. 275 Under either of these
definitions, a worker in an employment or labor dispute who is
subsequently asked about immigration status may be considered
covery of immigration status); De La Rosa v. N. Harvest Furniture, 210 F.R.D. 237, 238-
39 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that Hoffman was not "dispositive of the issues raised in the
motion to compel" discovery of immigration status in a Title VII action); Zeng Liu v.
Donna Karan Int'l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (questioning the ap-
plicability of Hoffman to the FLSA and denying the employer's request for discovery of
immigration status); Flores v. Albertson's, Inc., No. CV:0100515, 2002 WL 1163623, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2002) (finding Hoffman inapplicable to an FLSA action and refusing em-
ployer discovery requests regarding employees' immigration status); Gomez v. F & T Int'l
LLC, 842 N.Y.S. 2d 298, 301-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (refusing to allow defendant to seek
information about plaintiffs' immigration status after plaintiffs filed a wage claim because
to do so would intimidate plaintiffs from pursuing a legitimate claim).
271. See, e.g., Flores v. Limehouse, No. 2:04-1295, 2006 WL 1328762, at *1 (D.S.C. May
11, 2006) (ordering plaintiffs to respond to questions about immigration status before de-
nying defendants' summary judgment motion based on plaintiffs' undocumented status).
272. See, e.g., Patrick H. Hicks & Deborah L. Westbrook, Immigration Status as a De-
fense to Employment-Law Claims, 15 NEV. LAW. 26 (2007), available at http://www.nvbar.
org/Publications/Nevada%20Lawyer%20Magazine/2007/May/immigration.htm.
273. See id.
274. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmi-
grant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,017 (Sept. 17, 2007).
275. Id.
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a victim. The latter definition especially fits the discovery sce-
nario in which a worker pursuing a claim in litigation must seek
a protective order or risk deportation for pursuing the claim. Is-
suance of a U visa makes the exercise of seeking immigration
status irrelevant to a case by taking immigration status out of the
equation in labor and employment cases. By avoiding discovery
sidetracks into immigration issues, such protection refocuses the
litigation back on the underlying labor and employment condi-
tions for which the worker seeks redress.
V. BEYOND THE BASICS: U VISA FIXES THAT WILL FURTHER
EMPOWER CLASSES OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS
A. Restructure the U Visa Provisions to Provide Protection to a
Class
The current structure of U visa protection is individualized. A
victim of an enumerated crime who suffers substantial mental
and physical abuse is granted nonimmigrant status.276 This indi-
vidualized structure ignores the collective effects of activities re-
lated to crimes such as involuntary servitude, obstruction of jus-
tice, peonage, slave trade, and trafficking. A shift in the focus of
the U visa's purpose from a law enforcement tool to a protec-
tion/rights-conferring mechanism may require that U visa protec-
tion be extended to include victims who, while suffering from em-
ployer abuses, may not be needed to cooperate with law
enforcement authorities. In many cases, law enforcement will
need only a few of the victims to testify about a scheme or crime.
The rest of the victims may not be certified if there is no reason
for law enforcement to use their stories. Thus, from a scheme that
has entrapped hundreds of victims, only a handful may receive
law enforcement certification, depending on how broadly law en-
forcement officials exercise their discretion.
There are several possible ways to restructure the U visa pro-
vision to capture groups of victims in a workplace abuse situation.
First, victims who do not come forward first can still be consid-
ered direct victims who are presumptively willing to cooperate af-
ter the first set of victims cooperates and an investigation or con-
276. See 8 U.S.C. § li01(a)(15)(U)(i) (2000).
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viction demonstrates a criminal violation. Second, victims who
suffer but are not among the first to come forward can be consid-
ered indirect victims of the criminal activity. Third, a class
mechanism can be included in the U visa provision to allow for
law enforcement certification of a group of victims once an inves-
tigation or prosecution demonstrates criminal activity. The in-
terim regulations provides at least some support, and perhaps the
mechanism, for achieving the first two of these suggestions. A leg-
islative fix is necessary for the third.
1. Direct Victims
Once an investigation uncovers a group of workers who suf-
fered from workplace abuses that amount to criminal activity, the
EEOC or the DOL can issue LECs to group members on the pre-
sumption that each individual member of the group is willing to
cooperate with law enforcement officials in the investigation or
prosecution of the crime. The current U visa provision requires
neither that a victim actually cooperates nor that a prosecution
actually occurs.277 The certification of groups of workers can oc-
cur, therefore, without any change in the current statutory or
regulatory scheme.
2. Indirect Victims/Bystander Liability
Victims of employer abuse could be considered indirect victims
when they are part of a class but cannot show that they were di-
rectly harmed, were not among the first to come forward, or have
left the employer because of the abuse stemming from criminal
activity. One of the issues in the U visa provision that the interim
regulations clarified was the definition of "victim."27 The com-
mentary to the regulations state that the USCIS will interpret
"victim" broadly, in furtherance of Attorney General Guidelines
that define "victim" for the purposes of victim and witness assis-
tance.279 The Attorney General Guidelines provide for bystander
277. A law enforcement certification requires a statement that the victim "'has been
helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation or prosecution of
[enumerated] criminal activity." 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III) (2000)) (emphasis added).
278. See Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,036-37 (to be codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14)).
279. See id. at 53,016-17; OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
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victim status in some cases. The Guidelines state that "there may
be circumstances in which a bystander does suffer an unusually
direct injury, and Department personnel have the discretion to
treat this bystander as a victim." 280 The DHS interim rule on the
U visa provision states accordingly that "USCIS does not antici-
pate approving a significant number of applications from by-
standers, but will exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis to
treat bystanders as victims where that bystander suffers an un-
usually direct injury as a result of a qualifying crime." 28' This
standard is similar to bystander liability in tort law, which allows
a plaintiff who has suffered extreme emotional distress and who
is in the vicinity to recover for her injury.282
In the workplace context, this type of liability exists, for exam-
ple, when an employer retaliates by threatening to call immigra-
tion officials against one victim and induces such a chilling effect
on the rest of the employees that they are forced into submission.
Crimes like obstruction of justice have a broad chilling effect on
all workers who know about an employer's threats to call immi-
gration status into question. Therefore, the whole group of af-
fected workers who suffer workplace abuses should be covered by
the U visa provision as indirect victims when an employer threat-
ens to call immigration officials as an impendence for continued
work or in retaliation for employee grievances.
3. Class Law Enforcement Certification
Currently, a law enforcement agency must individually certify
each applicant's victim status and the willingness to cooperate.
2 83
A class-based certification mechanism would benefit a whole
group of victims even though they are not all needed to testify or
provide information about an employer's unlawful activity. This
type of mechanism would operate similarly to the certification of
class action status.284 Once the EEOC or DOL identify a class of
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 9 (2005), available at http:ll
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf.
280. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 279, at 10.
281. Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,016.
282. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
283. See 8 U.S.C. § 11 8 4 (p)(1) (Supp. V. 2005).
284. See Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law as an Impediment to Certifying a Na-
tional Class Action, 46 S. TEx. L. REV. 893, 894-95 (2005) for a brief description of the
class action certification process.
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victims, the agencies would act on a presumption that class
members were willing to cooperate in the investigation or prose-
cution of a given violation and its underlying criminal activity.
Class law enforcement certification has the advantage of effi-
ciency while at the same time protecting a broader group of work-
ers than the individual cooperation model. It also encourages col-
lective activity on the assumption that a group of workers facing
the same or similar workplace abuses will cooperate with each
other, and bolster each other's claims for legalization because of
their victim status. This is the first step in garnering rights for a
group of workers, assuming that legalization provides sufficient
protection from future abuse to risk stepping forward with a
claim.
Another virtue of the class action mechanism in U visa provi-
sions is that it addresses systemically the issue of labor exploita-
tion. Group certification allows workers to collaborate with each
other to publicly denounce employer practices. The alternative-
individual adjudication-masks the systemic nature of employer
schemes involving crimes such as debt peonage, involuntary ser-
vitude, or sexual discrimination offenses. A class mechanism
would allow labor and employment agencies to focus on the em-
ployment structures that facilitate exploitation of immigrant
workers. It would create a pool of workers from which federal
agencies could draw testimony about unlawful employment prac-
tices. Moreover, it would fulfill the legislation's purpose of pro-
tecting victims by targeting the exploitative practices that affect
groups of workers.
In the Caesars Palace harassment/rape case, for example, had
the EEOC filed a class action complaint, or one on behalf of the
Jane Doe undocumented victims, these victims could have sought
U visa status with the EEOC's assistance.2 5 More importantly,
victims with undocumented immediate relatives could seek U
visa status for their undocumented spouses and children, whose
claims are derivative to those of the principal victim. 2 6 Although
285. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
286. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii) (2000) (allowing derivative status for relatives of
enumerated crime victims when necessary to avoid extreme hardship); Eligibility for "U"
Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,036-37 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)
(14)(i)) (providing for derivative status when the direct victim is decreased, incompetent,
or incapacitated); id. at 53,039 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(f)(1)) (allowing an alien
who has been granted U-1 status to petition for derivative status for certain relatives).
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the regulations remain silent about whether a victim must be un-
documented, the purpose of the Act in preventing labor exploita-
tion would certainly continue to be met if undocumented immedi-
ate relatives of victims in mixed status families were allowed U
visa nonimmigrant status.
a. Remove the Caps on TVPA to Accommodate the Numbers of
Exploited Workers in Brown Collar Industries
Currently, the INA caps U visas at 10,000 per year.287 Al-
though the current visa caps have not been met in any year since
the implementation of the TVPA in 2000,288 the enactment of
regulations and the implementation of an immigration form and
process for adjudicating augur an increase in the number sought.
Moreover, if the focus of the program was expanded to more tra-
ditional labor and employment settings, the program's capacity
would need to expand. Legal scholar Orde Kittrie notes that the
visa cap does not nearly cover the estimated number of immi-
grant crime victims every year. 21' The fact that T visas are
capped at 5000 and U visas are capped at 10,000 means that less
than ten percent of the estimated 200,000 immigrant crime vic-
tims each year can take advantage of this legalization opportu-
nity.29° Even though T and U visas provide a path to citizenship,
and, therefore, full participation in civil society, the law enforce-
ment objective of the statute is reflected in the limited number of
visas available. Kittrie argues that the U visa path to legalization
is too limited to make an impact on the number of affected vic-
tims.291 The simple fix is to increase the caps on the number of
victims allowed to legalize as a result of their crime victim status.
A fix that would interfere less with the current scheme and, at
the same time, advance the purpose of the Act of preventing labor
exploitation would count only the first principal victim to step for-
ward in a group workplace situation; the rest would be considered
These provisions create a series of anomalies that are beyond the scope of this article, but
which deserve mention as possible complications in a strategy to confer benefits on imme-
diate relatives of a victim who is not herself undocumented.
287. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(p)(2) (Supp. V 2005).
288. FACT SHEET, supra note 118.
289. See Kittrie, supra note 5, at 1465-66.
290. See id. at 1464-65.
291. Id. at 1465.
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as derivatives, who are not counted against the cap in the typical
U visa situation.292
b. Provide an Expedited Method of LPR and Citizenship Status
to Lessen the Time that it Takes for a Victim to Become
Involved in the Civic Life of His or Her Community
For eligible crime victims, the U visa application process cur-
rently takes approximately six months.293 Once a U visa applicant
receives nonimmigrant status, she must wait three years to ad-
just status to lawful permanent resident. 294 A lawful permanent
resident must then wait five years to apply for citizenship. 295 This
means that the time between the victimization and the point at
which a victim has citizenship rights can last from eight to nine
years. This period of incorporation is exceedingly long, especially
if the goal of the Act is to protect victims from re-victimization by
helping them come out of the shadows of American existence. A
more effective way of avoiding a shadowed existence for victims is
to expeditiously integrate them in the civic life of their communi-
ties. Workers especially need to perceive that they can participate
actively and freely in the democratic affairs of their community in
order to strengthen collective efforts.
c. Provide a Private Right of Action for U Visa-Eligible Victims
Both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and
the FLSA provide for private rights of action against employers
who violate the statutes.296 Inserting a similar type of private
292. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2007) for a description of how derivatives do
not count against the 10,000 U visa cap.
293. This estimate is based on the author's experience with U visa deferred action fil-
ings. The recently enacted regulations may speed the process, although the Vermont Ser-
vice Center, the processing unit for U visa applications, indicates a processing time of
more than six months for related 1-360 petitions for domestic violence victims. See USCIS,
Processing Times and Case Status http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb
95919f35e66f6l4l76543frdla/?vgnextoid=189cf48f42466110VgnVCM1000004718190aRC
RD&vgnextchannel=54519c7755cb9Ol0VgnVCM10000045f3d6alRCRD (last visited Feb.
13, 12008).
294. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(m)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
295. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000).
296. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000). But see Alder v.
Moore, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (finding the FLSA's private right of action provision inap-
plicable to state employers on account of the Constitution's grant of sovereign immunity to
the States).
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right of action for crime victims in the workplace (as well as in
the domestic violence context) would give victims further incen-
tive to come forward with claims, which, in turn, will help eradi-
cate the more exploitative conditions that exist in brown collar
and other immigrant-dominated workplaces.
A similar private right of action was inserted into the TVPA for
trafficking victims in 2003.97 It provides a civil remedy for traf-
ficking, which ultimately gives a trafficking victim much more
control in the prosecution of cases.298 While the U and T visas
confer access to the political community through legal status, a
private right of action "has the broad potential of augmenting a
[crime victim's] claim to membership in the political community
through enforcement of individual civil rights."299
With the type of prosecutorial control that trafficking victims
currently exercise, U visa-eligible crime victims can incorporate
private lawsuits into a broader strategy of targeting and eliminat-
ing exploitative work conditions, especially in particularly egre-
gious workplaces. For example, in the trafficking context, a pri-
vate right of action gives plaintiffs the ability to develop the
parameters of each of the elements of severe forms of trafficking.
The criminal prosecution of trafficking is currently limited by the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Kosminski, which
requires coercion through actual or threatened use of physical
force or the legal process against the victim.3 °0 A civil suit under
the trafficking statute would give plaintiffs the opportunity to
litigate the different forms of coercion including psychological co-
ercion, that lead to involuntary servitude or debt peonage.3"' In
the civil context, U visa-eligible victims can test the parameters
of both the federal law and the various state laws that have de-
fined "trafficking" and "involuntary servitude."
297. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
193, § 4, 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)(2000)).
298. See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of
Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN'S
L.J. 1, 4 (2004).
299. Id. at 5.
300. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). But see United States v.
Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 302 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to adopt Kozminski's interpre-
tation of the TVPA on account of Congress's enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1589); United States
v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Section 1589 was intended [] to counter
[Kozminskil.").
301. See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 298, at 34-35.
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A private right of action would also empower crime victims to
seek remedies that neither the criminal justice system, labor and
employment law, nor the tort law scheme can seek directly. For
example, in the DeCoster case, in which female employees were
trafficked and sexually assaulted," 2 the EEOC could have sought
compensatory and punitive damages based on the women's pay
scale at the time of the violations. °3 It is less clear that the
women would have been able to recover higher punitive awards
than the current Title VII caps for the sexual assault claims that
were also criminal offenses 0 4 or that they would have been able
to recover such damages in a criminal prosecution. A private
right of action under a U visa scheme would have allowed such
recovery. 305
Most importantly, a private right of action would complement
the legalization framework by granting broader access to a legal
system than traditionally available to most newly arrived immi-
grants.
B. Incorporating U Visa Eligibility Screening Procedures into
Labor Department and EEOC Investigation Protocols
Traditionally, neither the DOL nor the EEOC have made it a
practice to seek information about the immigration status of
claimants that file charges with either agency. The rationale for
not seeking immigration status information is two-fold. First,
both agencies maintain the position that they are not prohibited
from seeking redress for undocumented workers. After the Su-
preme Court issued its decision in Hoffman, each agency issued
its interpretation of the effects on their operations. Both opined
that the decision had no effect on their authority over employer
violations that concerned undocumented workers. 306 Because
302. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
304. See id. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
305. Kim and Hreshchyshyn make a similar argument in favor of the private right of
action for T visa recipients. See Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 298, at 16. ("While a
criminal court cannot order non-economic damages, civil litigation can achieve substantial
deterrence of trafficking activity through high punitive awards.").
306. See, e.g., FACT SHEET #48, supra note 142 ("The Supreme Court's decision does not
mean that undocumented workers do not have rights under other U.S. labor laws.... The
Department's Wage and Hour Division will continue to enforce the FLSA and MSPA with-
out regard to whether an employee is documented or undocumented."); RESCISSION OF
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 158 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman in
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there is no need for the information, both agencies instructed
their investigators not to seek the information unnecessarily. °7
Second, because both agencies are subject to Freedom of Informa-
tion Act requests,"' the danger for each agency was that the
gathering of such private information during an investigation
would result in information unnecessarily being made public.
Because the U visa interim regulations specifically mention the
EEOC and the DOL as criminal investigating agencies that can
provide LECs to cooperating crime victims, both agencies should
revisit their "don't ask don't tell" policies with respect to immigra-
tion status. Each agency should create a protocol for gathering
the information at some point soon after an investigation reveals
employment and labor violations that parallel the enumerated
criminal activity in the U visa provisions. This likely means that
a separate meeting about immigration status should be intro-
duced into an investigator's protocol after an allegation and a re-
sponse have been received. It could be that, in the case of the
EEOC, the meeting occurs before mediation so that the employee
knows the possibility of legalization exists, and she need not fear
further investigation or discovery should the case go forward.
Alternatively, an agency could simply provide LECs and
immigration information across the board, recommending to all
parties that they seek immigration-related advice. Either way,
the protective purpose of the U visa statute, as well as the
proposed rights-conferring function of the provision, can be
achieved.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown the power of the U visa in creating
pockets of protection among immigrant workers who suffer work-
place abuses, whether or not those abuses result in criminal
prosecutions. The U visa can also provide the foundation for unit-
ing workers traditionally left out of collective activity in the
workplace because it provides otherwise unavailable protection
no way calls into question the settled principle that undocumented workers are covered by
the federal employment discrimination statutes and that it is as illegal for employers to
discriminate against them as it is to discriminate against individuals authorized to
work.").
307. See RECISSION OF ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 158.
308. See 5 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (2000).
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from obstruction of justice or attempts to use a worker's immigra-
tion status to retaliate or otherwise intimidate workers in a dis-
crimination or labor case. The U visa regulations have made it
explicit that eradicating labor exploitation is a key component of
the U visa provision. 0 9 By specifically including both the EEOC
and the DOL as examples of law enforcement agencies tasked
with providing certifications to cooperating victims, the regula-
tions open the door to a potentially empowering legalization
mechanism for undocumented workers. With a few fixes, the U
visa could very well encourage the type of worker solidarity that
exploitative workplaces require for change.
309. See New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Non-
immigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014, 53,014 (Sept. 17, 2007).
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